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 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis was born out of an intuition. I had just read quite a bit of Wittgenstein when I was 
leafing through a collection of poems (In ons leven tallozen) by Fernando Pessoa, beautifully 
translated into Dutch by August Willemsen. While reading Alberto Caeiro’s poem “There’s 
Metaphysics Enough in not Thinking about Anything”, for a moment I had the impression I 
was still reading Wittgenstein.1 Especially the second and third verses, which I will discuss in 
detail in Chapter 2, struck me as being utterly Wittgensteinian in nature: 
[…] 
What do I make of things? 
What is my opinion of causes and effects? 
What have I meditated in regards to God and the soul 
And about the creation of the world? 
 
I don’t know. For me, thinking about it is closing my eyes 
And not think. Drawing the shades 
Of my window (that has no shades).2 
[…] 
 
For Caeiro, asking such abstract questions equates drawing the shades of a window that has 
none. With Wittgenstein, we often encounter a similar idea: asking the wrong question leads to 
seeing problems where there are not any. What Caeiro and Wittgenstein both hint at, is that 
language not only enables understanding, but can also impede it, by blurring that which “is 
always before one’s eyes” (Wittgenstein 2009: 56). One of Caeiro’s collections of poems, The 
                                                          
1 Besides publishing little during his lifetime, most works belonging to the Pessoan corpus have to be attributed to 
one of Pessoa’s heteronyms, such as Ricardo Reis, Bernardo Soares and Alberto Caeiro. What sets heteronyms 
apart from pseudonyms, is that both the content and style of the writing differ from one heteronym to another. 
Since heteronymity plays such a fundamental role within the Pessoan corpus, I will discuss it in more detail in 
chapter 2.  
2 For the English translation of Caeiro’s poems, I have used a translation by Nuno Hipólito, available at 
http://www.umfernandopessoa.com/uploads/1/6/1/3/16136746/gr_eng.pdf (Accessed 31 May 2018). Where there 
were spelling errors, I have corrected them. For the original Portuguese ones, see https://www.luso-livros.net/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/Poemas-de-Alberto-Caeiro.pdf (Accessed 30 Jun. 2018). (Que idéia tenho eu das 
cousas?/ Que opinião tenho sobre as causas e os efeitos?/ Que tenho eu meditado sobre Deus e a alma/ E sobre a 
criação do Mundo?, Não sei. Para mim pensar nisso é fechar os olhos/ E não pensar. É correr as cortinas/ Da minha 
janela (mas ela não tem cortinas).  
 
 
 Keeper of Sheep (O Guardador de Rebanhos), is full of admonishments to ‘see through’ vague 
concepts and to open our eyes. Given this striking similarity in their criticism of abstract 
questions and the way they impede us from seeing the world aright, I decided that I wanted to 
attempt to do a Wittgensteinian reading of Pessoa. Before doing so, however, I immediately 
had to make some important conceptual choices. Both Wittgenstein and Pessoa are notoriously 
hard to pin down and one has to be particularly careful when making generalizing statements 
about these authors. While Wittgenstein’s output is usually divided into two phases, within 
Pessoa’s heteronymic universe there is no obvious place to start. Or so it seemed, until I 
stumbled upon a book by Nuno Ribeiro entitled Philosophical Essays. In this book, Ribeiro has 
tried to collect all fragments within the Pessoan corpus that are straightforwardly philosophical. 
Given that I now had a philosopher with poetic qualities on the one hand, a poet with 
philosophical gifts on the other and an inkling of philosophical affinity between Wittgenstein 
and Caeiro in between, I decided to give it a go.       
 The central question of this thesis is the following: Which are the philosophical affinities 
between Wittgenstein’s poetic philosophy and Pessoa’s philosophical poetry? In the first 
chapter, I want to firmly establish Wittgenstein as a poetic philosopher. In order to do so, I will 
zoom in on the poetic imagery he employs. For my argument that Wittgenstein’s imagery can 
indeed be said to be poetic in nature, I will employ Shklovsky’s famous distinction between 
poetic and non-poetic imagery. On the basis of this analysis I will show that, from a poetic point 
of view, there is much greater continuity between the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus and the one of the Philosophical Investigations than is sometimes believed. I 
will moreover argue that Wittgenstein primarily uses poetic imagery to visualize his 
propositions and hence render them visible to the reader. In Chapter 2, Fernando Pessoa will be 
the focus of my attention. In order to get a grip on his ‘philosophy’3, I will start by discussing 
the aforementioned Philosophical Essays. However much of interest for analysing questions 
surrounding Pessoa’s authorship, they offer little from a Wittgensteinian point of view. In the 
second part of this chapter I will therefore turn to Alberto Caeiro, Pessoa’s “master”4. By close-
reading a selection of his poems, I will try to show that they can be productively read from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective. We will see that for Caeiro, just as for Wittgenstein, seeing the 
                                                          
3 Given that Pessoa is not usually considered a philosopher, nor that we can speak of a Pessoan philosophical 
system, we have to be careful in attributing a ‘philosophy’ to him. Moreover, the different authors within the 
Pessoan corpus hold different ‘philosophies’, as we will see in chapter 2.  
4 In a letter dated January 13 1935, Pessoa asserts that Caeiro ‘appeared in him’ as his master: “aparecera em mim 
o meu mestre. Foi essa a sensação que tive” (my master appeared in me. That was the sensation I had) 
(http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/3007. Accessed 29 Jun. 2018). 
 world aright and using the right language are intimately related. Caeiro, however, explicitly 
denies being a philosopher (or a poet). In order to contextualize the philosophical activity that 
both Wittgenstein and Caeiro are engaged in, in Chapter 3 I will turn to Søren Kierkegaard. As 
the latter was greatly admired by Wittgenstein and employed “similar literary procedures” as 
Pessoa, I believe his concept of the ‘subjective thinker’ can serve as a model for thinking 
through the kind of philosophy practised by Wittgenstein and Caeiro (Bellaiche-Zacharie 2009: 
Abstract).           
 Although I am aware of the experimental character of this project, I do hope to convince 
my reader that reading Wittgenstein poetically and interpreting Caeiro from a language 
philosophical perspective sheds a new light on both. My argument ultimately hinges on the idea 
that for both Wittgenstein and Caeiro, despite their vastly different ‘truths’, writing philosophy 
and poetry are one. If philosophy is above all to convey a certain view of the world, it is the 
philosopher’s task to render his view of the world visible to the reader. When Caeiro claims that 
he is neither a philosopher nor a poet, he distances himself from metaphysical system builders; 
his philosophical poetry, however, does invite its readers to change the way they understand 
the world by looking at things differently. Just as Kierkegaard’s subjective thinker, however, 
he does not do so directly, but employs an indirect didactic approach. Instead of telling us what 
to do, Wittgenstein and Caeiro above all try to teach us how to look. By offering ‘true’ pictures 
of the world and dispelling false ones, they aspire to make us see our metaphysical assumptions 
and mistakes. Even if Wittgenstein and Caeiro do not share the same worldview, they agree on 
the importance of using the right language for seeing the world aright, whatever world that may 
be.    
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CHAPTER 1 
A POETIC PHILOSOPHER: LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 
When writing about Wittgenstein, one is required to specify which Wittgenstein one has in 
mind. It is still widely contested how the relation between the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus and the one of the Philosophical Investigations should be conceived.5 
What is  certain, however, is that both works are characterized by a distinct literary style. While 
the former’s rigidity seems to be illustrative of its logical picture theory of language, the latter’s 
mini-dialogues and thought experiments can be seen as indicative of its espousal of language 
as a conglomeration of language games. It is nonetheless hard to establish exactly to what extent 
style and content can be said to coincide in either case.6 In order to argue for Wittgenstein as a 
poetic philosopher, I will therefore specifically zoom in on Wittgenstein’s poetic imagery. 
While this puts some limits to my argument, I believe it to have three major advantages over a 
more broadly conceived  stylistic analysis. First, an analysis aspiring to give a more or less all-
encompassing overview of Wittgenstein’s style would lead to all kinds of philosophical 
discussions that fall outside of the scope of this thesis. Arguing for the unity of style and content 
of Wittgenstein’s work merits a thesis in itself, given the enormous scope of such a project. 
Second, an analysis of his use of poetic imagery will be seen to suffice to qualify him as a poetic 
philosopher. Third, it is foremost through his poetic imagery that he puts forward the idea that 
seeing the world correctly hinges on language. This is also one of the most important affinities 
between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Caeiro’s poetry, as we will see later on.   
 In Culture and Value, Wittgenstein writes that “philosophy ought really to be written 
only as a form of poetry” (Wittgenstein 1984: 483). I want to take this assertion to heart and 
argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is of a poetic nature. I contend that by doing so, often 
overlooked aspects of his works will come to the fore. One of the most striking results of reading 
Wittgenstein through a poetic lens is that the continuity between the Wittgenstein of the 
Tractatus and that of the Investigations will become very much apparent. In both works, he 
                                                          
5 In ‘Mild Mono-Wittgensteinianism’, James Conant expresses the difficulty of defining the character of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical work as follows: “The first half of the difficulty is to do full justice to the profound 
discontinuity in Wittgenstein’s thinking without neglecting (as those who I will call “standard readers” do) the 
extent to which it is folded within a fundamental continuity in his philosophy. The second half of the difficulty is 
to do full justice to the profound continuity in his thinking without minimizing […] the extent to which it is folded 
within a fundamental discontinuity in his philosophy” (Conant 2007: 31/32).  
6 In “Philosophy as Poetry? Reflection’s on Wittgenstein’s Style”, Edward Kanterian asserts that “Wittgenstein’s 
unusual writing style poses a great challenge to the understanding of his philosophy. It is not even clear how to 
relate his style to his philosophy, especially as developed after 1929” (Kanterian 2012: 95). He further states that 
the most widespread approaches to treat Wittgenstein’s style are either “to treat his style as a mere personal or 
cultural idiosyncrasy, or to believe that it makes up the essence of his philosophy” (Kanterian 2012: 95).   
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conjures up a plethora of idiosyncratic images in order to elucidate his philosophical arguments. 
In order to get a clear understanding of the fundamental role of poetic imagery for 
Wittgenstein’s way of doing philosophy, I will discuss the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the 
Investigations and the notebooks separately. The central question of this chapter is: what is the 
function of Wittgenstein’s poetic imagery?  
 
1.1  THE METAPHORS OF THE TRACTATUS 
In “Wittgenstein’s Language and Beckett: The Limits of Language and the Absurd”, Marialena 
Avgerinou argues that “Wittgenstein’s language on language indicates that philosophy and 
literary style are not separate, as the form mirrors the context and content” (Avgerinou 2017: 
366). If Avgerinou is right, then we cannot properly discuss the contents of the Tractatus 
without heeding its style. To support this assertion, she writes that “the Tractatus, arguing for 
the impossibility of articulating anything meaningfully except for propositions on the natural 
sciences, is itself written in the most laconic, scientific way possible” (366). She is certainly not 
the only one to have remarked on Wittgenstein’s sparse prose. In “Philosophy as Poetry? 
Reflections on Wittgenstein’s Style”, Edward Kanterian notes that “the [Tractatus’s] prose is 
condensed to a bare minimum, eliminating any redundancy, with many sentences exhibiting 
the character of definitive oracular pronouncements, ordered by means of intricate numeration” 
(Kanterian 2012: 96). At first glance this might indeed seem to be the case. Lacking a narrative 
and subdivided into seven propositions that are again subdivided into a long list of sub 
propositions, Wittgenstein’s treatise offers itself as an attempt to write a logical argument of 
the most crystalline sort, or simply a full-blown “theory of logic”, as Bertrand Russell wrote in 
his 1922 introduction to the work (Wittgenstein 2018: 8).      
 Yet, there are more than a few propositions that do not fit this logical picture. In 
Wittgenstein’s Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary, Marjorie Perloff, 
for example, argues that the Tractatus could be read just as well as pertaining to the “literature 
of World War I” (Perloff 2012: 25). According to Perloff, “it was primarily Wittgenstein’s war 
experience that transformed the Tractatus from logical, scientific treatise to something quite 
different – a book closer to the avant-garde poetic fictions of the teens and twenties than to the 
philosophical work that first brought Wittgenstein to the Cambridge of Bertrand Russell and 
G.E. Moore” (25). In order to argue for a more poetic, even ‘mystical’ Wittgenstein, scholars 
often allude to propositions such as §6.42, as Perloff herself does too: 
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The first thought in setting up an ethical law of the form “thou shalt . . . “is: And 
what if I do not? But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and 
reward in the ordinary sense. This question as to the consequences of an action 
must therefore be irrelevant . . . . There must be some sort of ethical reward and 
ethical punishment, but this must lie in the action itself (Perloff 2012: 
30/Wittgenstein 2018: 107). 
 
While propositions like §6.42 indeed suggest that the Tractatus does not fit the mould of a 
strictly logical work, it is rarely acknowledged that even many of the propositions that purely 
have to do with Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language are not just logical, but also literary, 
as they are full of poetic imagery.         
 In his seminal 1917 article ”Art as Technique”, Viktor Skhlovsky argues that we should 
distinguish between two kinds of images: poetic and non-poetic. While poetic imagery intends 
to defamiliarize our perception, non-poetic imagery tends to the economy of expression. In 
order to explain the difference between the two, Shklovsky gives the following example:  
I want to attract the attention of a young child who is eating bread and butter and 
getting the butter on her fingers. I call, “Hey, butterfingers!” This is a figure of 
speech, a clearly prosaic trope. Now a different example. The child is playing with 
my glasses and drops them. I call, “Hey, butterfingers!” This figure of speech is a 
poetic trope. 
 
Wittgenstein’s imagery seems to be a hybrid between the two. His images serve both to 
defamiliarize us from the way we envisaged the workings of language before and to familiarize 
us with his picture theory of language. Although Wittgenstein thus employs images in order to 
elucidate his propositions, the overall scope of the Tractatus is to alter our perception of 
language itself, making the defamiliarizing quality of his images dominant. By closely 
scrutinizing the Tractatus’s propositions, I will show that Wittgenstein uses a broad range of 
imagery to make us ‘see’ his picture theory of language. This will lead to an altogether different 
picture of the ‘sparse’ Tractatus: it will show that in order to argue for his picture theory of 
language, Wittgenstein constantly resorts to metaphors and poetic language. While his picture 
theory of language seems to relegate poetic language to a second plan, Wittgenstein actually 
continuously employs poetic language in order to elucidate his logical propositions.7
                                                          
7 In “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy”, Derrida even argues that metaphors are ineradicably 
part of philosophical discourse. Referring to Aristotle’s Poetics, Derrida writes that: “The appeal to criteria of 
clarity and obscurity would be enough to establish […] that this whole philosophical delimitation of metaphor is 
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 Although there certainly cannot be said to have been a lack of scientific interest in the 
Tractatus, surprisingly little has been written on Wittgenstein’s use of poetic imagery. One of 
the few articles that specifically deals with this topic is a 1979 article by Jerry H. Gill called 
“Wittgenstein and Metaphor”. In this article, Gill sets out to analyse Wittgenstein’s implicit 
views on the nature of metaphors, as propounded in The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
Investigations and On Certainty (Gill 1979: 272). Regarding the Tractatus, Gill writes that “the 
root metaphor” upon which Wittgenstein bases linguistic meaning in this work is ‘logical space’ 
(272). In other words, the whole project of trying to ground linguistic meaning in “the formal, 
abstract structure of language” rests on a metaphor (272). He then goes on to spell out how we 
should understand the view of language Wittgenstein develops within the Tractatus in the light 
of this root metaphor. According to Gill, one of the most important consequences of this 
metaphor is that it carries with it “a visual perspective” (272):  
[W]ithin the view thereby espoused the relation between reality and thought (as 
well as language) is said to be one of “picturing”. The latter pictures the former. 
[…] Also as the view is espoused, the relation between it and the speaker 
(Wittgenstein), together with the hearer, is a visual one. We are asked to see the 
relation between language and reality in much the same way as we would a vast 
but finite, perhaps two-dimensional, space populated by points joined by lines, in 
a grid-like fashion (272) 
 
Following Gill, the metaphor of logical space thus leads to the idea that language has an 
underlying structure that can be seen. Moreover, the explanation of this relation itself should be 
seen by the reader to be properly understood. He further argues that it is ultimately due to this 
metaphor of logical space and its correlates that Wittgenstein asserts that we are to “kick the 
ladder [the Tractatus] over after climbing up it” (272). While Wittgenstein needed the metaphor 
of logical space to espouse his view of language, it is this same logical space that allows “no 
room for the very metaphorical expressions upon which the view itself is based” (274).    
 However, in the Tractatus itself, metaphorical expressions abound. In order to elucidate 
his view of language as logical space, Wittgenstein resorts time and again to metaphors and 
similes. Joachim Schulte asserts that  
 
                                                          
already constructed and worked upon by “metaphors” How could a piece of knowledge or a language be clear or 
obscure properly speaking? Now all the concepts which have played a part in the definition of metaphor always 
have an origin and a force which are themselves “metaphorical” […] (Derrida 1974: 54). 
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In the Tractatus Wittgenstein held that there was a favoured sense sense of “say” 
in which only a certain empirical, decidably true-or-false, type of statement could 
legitimately be said to be “said”. All other sentences were declared to be nonsense 
or senseless. Still, at the time of  the Tractatus Wittgenstein thought it was possible 
to use senseless or nonsensical sentences in more or less indirect ways to convey 
insights which in his opinion could not be communicated by means of “saying” 
something; but nonsensical utterances could be used to “show” that which it was 
impossible to “say” (Schulte 1989: 146). 
 
If Wittgenstein thus employs metaphorical, “nonsensical” language in the Tractatus, he does 
so in order to “show” what cannot be “said”. Although this kind of language transcends the 
boundaries of the meaningful, it can offer insights that cannot be expressed within this domain.8 
His view of language as logical space does not lend itself to true-or-false declarations, but needs 
to be seen integrally. The argumentative structure of the Tractatus is hence circular, as 
Wittgenstein himself readily acknowledges: in the very first sentence of its foreword, he writes 
that “[T]his book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already 
thought the thoughts which are expressed in it – or similar thoughts” (Wittgenstein 2018: 
Preface). To be able to understand the sense and the nonsensicality of its propositions, we 
already need to have thought similar thoughts to those expressed in the Tractatus. The 
nonsensical metaphors of the Tractatus are meant to show these thoughts to those who have 
not.9            
 In order to appreciate the great variety of images Wittgenstein conjures up in order to 
explicate his view of language as logical space, I have compiled a list of all propositions that 
contain poetic imagery: 
2.0232 In a manner of speaking, objects are colourless.10 
2.03 In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain. 
                                                          
8 Schulte notes an interesting similarity here between Wittgenstein’s “doctrine of saying and showing” and 
Davidson’s “account of metaphor”, as put forward in “What Metaphors Mean” (1978): “Davidson does not call 
metaphors senseless or nonsensical but he observes that, according to his own conception of literal or primary 
meaning, most metaphors would have to count as straightforwardly false. A confused philosopher is not a fly: 
consequently Wittgenstein’s statement that he wishes to help the fly out of the fly-bottle is literally false. But in 
spite of its falsehood it may be possible to use it to intimate or convey something. And that is the typical way 
metaphor works: That which is being “said” is false, but by saying it in a certain way and in a certain context one 
may nevertheless succeed in getting something across” (Schulte 1989: 146/147).   
9 In “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor”, George Lakoff argues amongst other that ““Metaphor is the main 
mechanism through which we comprehend abstract concepts and perform abstract reasoning”, and that “Metaphor 
allows us to understand a relatively abstract or inherently unstructured subject matter in terms of a more concrete, 
or at least a more highly structured subject matter” (Lakoff 1993: 40/41). Both assertions chime well with the way 
Wittgenstein uses metaphors to elucidate abstract thought. 
10 For the English translations of these propositions, I have used the Pears/McGuinness translation, available at 
https://people.umass.edu/klement/tlp/tlp.pdf (Accessed 31 May. 2018). 
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2.1512 It is laid against reality like a measure. 
4.002 […] Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form 
of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because 
the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, 
but for entirely different purposes. […] 
4.014  A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-
waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that 
holds between language and the world.      
 They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern.  
 (Like the two youths in the fairy-tale, their two horses, and their lilies. 
They are all in a certain sense one.)  
4.1221 An internal property of a fact can also be called a feature of that fact (in 
the sense in which we speak of facial features, for example.) 
4.461 Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that 
they say nothing.         
 A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a 
contradiction is true on no condition.     
 Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.    
 (Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one 
another.) 
 (For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is 
either raining or not raining.) 
4.463 The truth-conditions of a proposition determine the range that it leaves open 
to the facts.          
 (A proposition, a picture, or a model is, in the negative sense, like a solid 
body that restricts the freedom of movement of others, and, in the positive sense, 
like a space bounded by solid substance in which there is room for a body.) […]   
5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?   
 You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. 
But really you do not see the eye.        
 And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.  
6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used 
them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the 
ladder after he has climbed up it.)   
7 He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. […]11 
                                                          
11 2.0232 Beiläufig gesprochen: Die Gegenstände sind farblos. 2.03 Im Sachverhalt hängen die Gegenstände 
ineinander, wie die Glieder einer Kette. 2.1512 Es ist wie ein Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit angelegt. 4.002 Die 
Sprache verkleidet den Gedanken. Und zwar so, dass man der äußeren Form des Kleides, nicht auf die Form des 
bekleideten Gedankens schließen kann; weil die äußere Form des Kleides nach ganz anderen Zwecken gebildet ist 
als danach, die Form des Körpers erkennen zu lassen. 4.014 Die Grammophonplatte, der musikalische Gedanke, 
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Wittgenstein’s images are both idiosyncratic and defamiliarizing. If we look at 4.002 for 
example, we read that language disguises thought. In order to make us see how it does so, 
Wittgenstein compares  language to the way clothing and the body relate to one another: just as 
clothes are not intended to reveal the shape of the body, language is not meant to reveal thought. 
Contrary to the common sense that thought is expressed in language, Wittgenstein thus 
maintains we have to peel off layers of language to arrive at thought. To make this unorthodox 
view of the relation between language and thought intelligible, he rephrases it in the poetic 
image of clothing and the body. The same goes for a proposition such as 4.014. Wanting to 
convey the depicting relation between language and the world, Wittgenstein compares it to the 
internal relation of depicting between a gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes 
and the sound waves. With this poetic image, he encourages us to visualize his picture theory 
of language. By employing ordinary words in these unusual ways, they become defamiliarizing 
tools for altering the way we perceive language.       
 As Wittgenstein states in the final proposition (7), the reader of the Tractatus ultimately 
has to transcend this work, so that he will see the world aright. He can only throw away the 
ladder that is the Tractatus, though, if he has understood the sense and the nonsensicality of its 
propositions. His poetic imagery help to make both understood by illuminating both the sense 
of his singular propositions and the overall nonsensicality of the work (the ladder eventually 
needs to be thrown away). It is thus by no means the case that Wittgenstein shuns poetic 
language. Quite the contrary: he continuously employs poetic language to clarify his 
philosophical propositions. Instead of a work written in the most philosophically condensed 
way possible, a different picture of the Tractatus emerges: rather than having to dispense with 
                                                          
die Notenschrift, die Schallenwellen, stehen alle in jener abbildenden internen Beziehung zu einander, die 
zwischen Sprache und Welt besteht. Ihnen allen ist der logische Bau gemeinsam. (Wie im Märchen die zwei 
Jünglinge, ihre zwei Pferde und ihre Lilien. Sie sind alle in gewissem Sinne Eins.). 4.1221 Eine interne Eigenschaft 
einer Tatsache können wir auch einen Zug dieser Tatsache nennen. (In dem Sinn, in welchem wir etwa van 
Gesichtszügen sprechen). 4.461 (Der Satz zeigt was er sagt, die Tautologie und die Kontradiktion, dass sie nichts 
sagen. Die Tautologie hat keine Wahrheitsbedingen, denn sie ist bedingungslos wahr; und die Kontradiktion ist 
unter keiner Bedingung wahr. Tautologie und Kontradiktion sind sinnlos. (Wie der Punkt, von dem zwei Pfeile in 
entgegengesetzter Richtung auseinandergehen.) (Ich weiß z. B. nichts über das Wetter, wenn ich weiß, dass es 
regnet oder nicht regnet.) 4.463 Die Wahrheitsbedingungen bestimmen den Spielraum, der den Tatsachen durch 
den Satz gelassen wird. (Der Satz, das Bild, das Modell, sind im negativen Sinne wie ein fester Körper, der die 
Bewegungsfreiheit der anderen beschränkt; im positiven Sinne, wie der von fester Substanz begrenzte Raum, 
worin ein Körper Platz hat.) […] 5.123 Wenn ein Gott eine Welt erschafft, worin gewisse Sätze wahr sind, so 
schafft er damit auch schon eine Welt, in welcher alle ihre Folgesätze stimmen. Und ähnlich könnte er keine Welt 
schaffen, worin der Satz „p“ wahr ist, ohne seine sämtlichen Gegenstände zu schaffen. 5.633 Wo in der Welt ist 
ein metaphysisches Subjekt zu merken? Du sagst, es verhält sich hier ganz wie mit Auge und Gesichtsfeld. Aber 
das Auge siehst du wirklich nicht. Und nichts am Gesichtsfeld lässt darauf schließen, dass es von einem Auge 
gesehen wird. 6.54 Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, dass sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig 
erkennt, wenn er durch sie – auf ihnen – über sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er muss sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen, 
nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.) 7 Er muss diese Sätze überwinden, dann sieht er die Welt richtig 
(Wittgenstein 2018: https://people.umass.edu/klement/tlp/tlp.pdf. Accessed 29 Jun. 2018).   
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it, it constantly needs poetic imagery to elucidate philosophical propositions. Again, as was the 
case with the root metaphor of logical space, metaphors and similes serve to make the reader 
see the proposition and hence see the world aright. As Wittgenstein writes himself in §3.1431:  
The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one 
composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written 
signs.  
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the 
proposition.12 
 
Although the propositions having to do with seeing are the most numerous, Wittgenstein’s 
allusions to sensory sensations are not limited to the visual. In various places, he even talks 
about the way propositions feel: 
2.151 That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it. 
2.1515 These correlations are, as it were, the feelers of the picture’s elements, 
with which the picture touches reality. 
4.411 It immediately strikes one as probable that the introduction of elementary 
propositions provides the basis for understanding all other kinds of proposition. 
Indeed, the understanding of general propositions palpably depends on the 
understanding of elementary propositions.13 
 
Considering the sheer quantity of poetic imagery Wittgenstein employs in the Tractatus and the 
vital role it plays in rendering its propositions perceptible, we can only conclude that 
Avgerinou’s assertion that the Tractatus is written in “the most laconic, scientific way possible” 
must be false. Instead of limiting himself to scientific language, Wittgenstein continuously 
employs poetic language in order to make himself understood. If we succeed in “throwing the 
ladder away”, it is precisely because of these poetic images that make us see, feel and hear 
language in a different way. When discussing the Investigations, I will argue that ‘seeing’ the 
world differently through poetic imagery remains an all-important aspect of Wittgenstein’s 
method of doing philosophy.  
                                                          
12 Sehr klar wird das Wesen des Satzzeichens, wenn wir es uns, statt aus Schriftzeichen, aus räumlichen 
Gegenständen (etwa Tischen, Stühlen, Büchern) zusammengesetzt denken. Die gegenseitige räumliche Lage 
dieser Dinge drückt dann den Sinn des Satzes aus (Wittgenstein 2018: 22) 
13 2.151 Das Bild ist so mit der Wirklichkeit verknüpft – es reicht bis zu ihr. 2.1515 Diese Zuordnungen sind 
gleichsam die Fühler der Bildelemente, mit denen das Bild die Wirklichkeit berührt. 4.411 Es ist von vornherein 
wahrscheinlich, dass die Einführung der Elementarsätze für das Verständnis aller anderen Satzarten grundlegend 
ist. Ja, das Verständnis der allgemeinen Sätze hängt fühlbar von dem der Elementarsätze ab. 
(https://people.umass.edu/klement/tlp/tlp.pdf. Accessed 29 Jun. 2018) 
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1.2  LANGUAGE GAMES 
In the Investigations, Wittgenstein radically breaks with his picture theory of language. Instead 
of attempting to uncover the logical structure underlying our daily language, it is now daily 
language itself that becomes the focal point of his attention. Explaining this shift from logics to 
ordinary language, in §115 he famously exclaims that: “A picture held us captive. And we 
couldn’t get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us 
inexorably” (Wittgenstein 2009: 53).14 Wittgenstein thus again stresses the connection between 
language and seeing.15 This time around, though, he will argue against the images he himself 
has helped to erect. In the Investigations, there is no room anymore for logical space and 
comparisons between the disguising qualities of daily language and clothing. In order to explain 
why he was initially led astray, Wittgenstein asserts that language’s use simply had not occurred 
to him. In §129 we read: 
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their 
simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is 
always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike 
people at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck them. – And this means: we 
fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.16  
 
The most important aspects of language were thus always right in front of us, for everyone to 
see. We did not notice them, however, as the problems arising “through a misinterpretation of 
our forms of language have the character of depth” (Wittgenstein 2009: 53; §111). While the 
‘problems’ he raised in the Tractatus appeared to be deep, he was thus fooled in thinking that 
they were problems at all. For this reason the Wittgenstein of the Investigations writes that 
“philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our 
                                                          
14 [E]in Bild hielt uns gefangen. Und heraus konnten wir nicht, denn es lag in unsrer Sprache, und sie schien es 
uns nur unerbittlich zu wiederholen. 
15 In “Seeing the everyday otherwise: vision, ethics and utopia in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations”, 
Ben Ware observes the following: “In the Preface to Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein describes his mode 
of philosophical composition as akin to that of the visual artist. ‘The philosophical remarks in this book are’, he 
writes, ‘a number of sketches of landscapes […] made in the course of […] long and involved journeys.’ The 
purpose of these sketches, as Wittgenstein suggests, is to teach ‘a new style of thinking’, which consists in an 
ability to see clearly (PI §§5, 51) the things that are always in front of our eyes, but which ‘are hidden because of 
their simplicity and familiarity’ (PI §129). Here Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as an activity which 
involves relearning how to ‘look’ (PI §66) at the world, reflects an important concern, evident throughout his 
writings, with the categories of ‘seeing’ and ‘vision’” (Ware 2014: 23). 
16 Die für uns wichtigsten Aspekte der Dinge sind durch ihre Einfachheit und Alltäglichkeit verborgen. (Man kann 
es nicht bemerken, - weil man es immer vor Augen hat.) Die eigentlichen Grundlagen seiner Forschung fallen dem 
Menschen gar nicht auf. Es sei denn, daß ihm dies einmal aufgefallen ist. – Und das heißt: das, was einmal gesehen, 
das Auffallendste und Stärkste ist, fällt uns nicht auf (Wittgenstein 2009: 56). 
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language” (Wittgenstein 2009: 52; §109).17 Arguing against his former picture theory of 
language and those “deep disquietudes [the ‘problems’ of language]”, that are “as deeply rooted 
in us as the forms of our language”, he now sees language as a conglomerate of language games 
(Wittgenstein 2009: 52/53; §111). In the following, I will discuss how Wittgenstein conveys 
this new view of language within the Investigations. We will see that while differing in content, 
poetic imagery still plays a key role within his philosophical method.   
 The Investigations, just like the Tractatus, is built around a metaphor. While ‘logical 
space’ is the key metaphor of the Tractatus, the Investigations hinges on the notion of ‘language 
games’. The first time Wittgenstein talks about language games is in §7. He does so in order to 
describe Augustine’s depiction of the nature of language, which held that words in language 
name objects. Wittgenstein does not dispute the veracity of Augustine’s account, but simply 
states that it gives us an incomplete picture of language. For him, it denotes just one language 
game among many (Wittgenstein 2009: 8). Taking Augustine’s view of language as its point of 
departure, the Investigations constitutes an attempt to show how language consists of an 
incredible variety of games. ‘Showing’ should be taken quite literally here; just as in the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein employs a great amount of examples and poetic imagery in order to 
make us see his philosophical argument. One of the most famous of these images is that of 
‘family resemblances’. Arguing for the non-essentialist character of our use of the word ‘game’, 
Wittgenstein writes that: “[…] the various resemblances between members of a family – build, 
features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth – overlap and criss-cross in 
the same way. – And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family. […] (Wittgenstein 2009: 36; §67).18 
Just as it is impossible to establish rules that bind all games together, the same goes for 
language. According to Wittgenstein, any attempt to capture language in an overarching 
theoretical framework is bound to fail: “[language games have] no one thing in common in 
virtue of which we use the same word for all – but there are many different kinds of affinity 
between them” (Wittgenstein 2009: 35; §65). He does not deny that we do require an overview, 
however, and that it is precisely this lack of an overview that makes us fail to see language as 
consisting of language games. In §122 we read that: 
[…] – Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation 
produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing 
connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.  
                                                          
17 Die Philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung unseres Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer Sprache. 
18 Denn so übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie 
bestehen: Wuchs, Gesichtszüge, Augenfarbe, Gang, Temperament, etc. etc. – Und ich werde sagen: die ‘Spiele‘ 
bilden eine Familie. 
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The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. 
It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a 
‘Weltanschaaung’?)19  
 
In order to get an overview of language as language games, Wittgenstein thus accords a central 
role to something he calls “surveyable representations”, which determine the way we look at 
things. Wittgenstein’s notion of language games and the language games he subsequently plays 
in the Investigations accordingly serve the purpose of being surveyable representations of the 
way language functions. When he asks us to think of language as a collection of “games”, we 
should moreover take this quite literally. Within the Investigations, the peculiarity of 
metaphorical language no  longer consists in “showing” that which cannot be “said”, as was the 
case within the Tractatus, but in its “special use of language” (Schulte 1989: 144). This does 
not however imply that metaphors have “a special, or figurative, meaning we might wish to 
assign to it” (144).20 Wittgenstein elucidates his view of metaphorical language by giving the 
following example: “If I say “For me the vowel e is yellow” I do not mean: ‘yellow’ in a 
metaphorical sense [in übertragener Bedeutung] , - for I could not express what I want to say 
in any other way than by means of the idea [mittels des Begriffs] ‘yellow’” (Wittgenstein 2009: 
228; §278). Hence, when Wittgenstein describes the workings of language in terms of “games” 
and the relationship between these games as “family resemblances”, these words do not take up 
some special metaphorical sense, but stay firmly attached to their ‘usual’ meaning. It is 
precisely because we understand their ‘usual’ meaning that we can make sense of these 
metaphors: for Wittgenstein, there is no other way to explain “For me the vowel e is yellow” 
than by simply referring back to our ‘usual’ use of ‘yellow’.21 If the Investigation’s ‘surveyable 
                                                          
19 Unserer Grammatik fehlt es an Übersichtlichkeit. – Die übersichtliche Darstellung vermittelt das Verständnis, 
welches eben darin besteht, daß wir die ‘Zusammenhänge sehen‘. Daher die Wichtigkeit des Findens und des 
Erfindens von Zwischengliedern. Der Begriff der übersichtlichen Darstellung ist für uns von grundlegender 
Bedeutung. Er bezeichnet unsere Darstellungsform, die Art, wie wir die Dinge sehen. (Ist dies eine 
‘Weltanschauung?‘) (Wittgenstein 2009: 54/55. §122). 
20 The following is inspired by Schulte (1989).  
21 This account of metaphorical language is at odds with other prominent accounts of metaphor, most notably by 
Max Black, which revolves around the notions of “frame” and “focus”: ““The chairman ploughed through the 
discussion.” In calling this sentence a case of metaphor, we are implying that at least one word (here, the word 
“ploughed”) is being used metaphorically in the sentence, and that at least one of the remaining words is being 
used literally. Let us call the word “ploughed” the focus of the metaphor, and the remainder of the sentence in 
which that word occurs the frame. (Are we now using metaphors – and mixed ones at that? Does it matter?) One 
notion that needs to be clarified is that of the “metaphorical use” of the focus of metaphor. Among other things, it 
would be good to understand how the presence of one frame can be result in metaphorical use of the complimentary 
word, while the presence of a different frame for the same word fails to result in metaphor” (Black 1955: 275/276). 
Whereas Wittgenstein believes that the “metaphorical use” of a word can only be explained by referring to its 
primary use, Black maintains that metaphors, being “a species of catachresis”, put “new senses into old words” 
(280). See also Davidson (1978) and Black (1979). 
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representations’ help us in understanding his view of language, it is hence because we 
understand the ‘usual’ use of the words they consist of.     
 In addition to the ‘surveyable representation’ of “games” and  “family resemblances”, 
the Investigations contains many more poetic images. In Wittgenstein and the Creativity of 
Language, Sebastian Sunday Grève and Jakub Mácha give an extensive list of all its poetic 
imagery, including an analogy between “chess and language (§31; §108)” and the simile of  
“language as an ancient city: “a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of 
houses with extension from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new 
suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses””(Grève and Macha 2016: 9; 
Wittgenstein §18). But Wittgenstein also compares primitive language to tools (§14), 
philosophy’s resistance to details with assuming that mice come into being “by spontaneous 
generation out of grey rags and dust” (§52), and playing language games to “people amusing 
themselves in a field by playing with a ball” (§83). Just as in the Tractatus, time and again he 
conjures up poetic images in order to make his philosophical remarks perceptible. This time, 
though, there is no ladder to be kicked away at the end. As everything we want to know about 
language is already plain to see, there is nothing to surmount. Instead, in the Investigations 
Wittgenstein asserts that it is philosophy’s task to show “the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” 
(Wittgenstein 2009: 110). In Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing, Judith Genova gives an extensive 
analysis of this analogy that highlights the intimate relation between language, philosophy and 
seeing within Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought: 
Lured by the presence of some ideal form of sustenance, flies unwittingly trap 
themselves. Once caught, all their usual methods of dealing with the environment 
become ineffective; they have lost their way. Instead of seeking new methods to 
cope with their unusual circumstances, they stubbornly thrust themselves again 
and again against the glass, clinging to the illusion that freedom is only a matter 
of their persistence. Some make forays to the left or right of their battered position; 
others, the more stalwart of the species, manage to tour the whole bottle. […] One 
need only turn around - make an imaginative leap - to see the opening. For flies, 
however, this is impossible. Escape, when achieved, is always a matter of luck 
and determination. Their methods are instinctually rigid and their experiments 
random. Thus, most perish in what they thought would be the land of milk and 
honey.           
 In similar fashion, philosophers pursuing an ideal form of explanation 
entrap themselves. Viewing philosophy as either a form of ultraphysics or secular 
theology, they inadvertently bottle themselves in theories and systems which have 
lost all contact with reality […]” (Genova 1995: 9). 
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Philosophers are those who have forgotten how to see because they employed the wrong 
conceptual apparatus. In this context Wittgenstein writes that “[T]here is not a single 
philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it were” 
(Wittgenstein 2009: 57; §133). The right method of doing philosophy is not by senselessly 
looking for the method  to solve philosophy’s problems; instead, “a method is […] 
demonstrated by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off. – Problems are solved 
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem” (57; §133). Examples are thus explicitly 
instrumental to Wittgenstein’s philosophical method, as our enumeration of Wittgenstein’s 
poetic imagery already made clear.        
 At this point, we can appreciate that both in the Tractatus and in the Investigations, 
poetic imagery appears as an integral part of Wittgenstein’s method of doing philosophy. The 
imagery Wittgenstein conjures up indeed has become so much intertwined with his philosophy 
that it is impossible to understand his philosophical method without it. In several of his 
unpublished works he has explicitly expressed his views about the affinity between philosophy 
and poetry, none the more so than in Culture and Value (Vermischte Bemerkungen) 
 
1.3 WITTGENSTEIN ON POETRY 
While the Tractatus and Investigations already showed to be interspersed with poetic imagery, 
this is even more the case with his notebooks. Many of the thoughts Wittgenstein expresses in 
these works immediately contain a pictorial counterpart. What sets these notebooks apart from 
the Tractatus and the Investigations, however, is that Wittgenstein specifically addresses the 
relation between philosophy and poetry in these works. His most straightforward account of 
their relation is to be found in Culture and Value, where a passage dated 1933-1934 reads as 
follows: 
I believe I summed up where I stand to philosophy when I said: really one should write 
philosophy only as one writes a poem. That, it seems to me, must reveal how far my 
thinking belongs to the present, the future, or the past. For I was acknowledging myself, 
with these words, to be someone who cannot quite do what he would like to be able to 
do.22   
                                                          
22 Ich glaube meine Stellung zur Philosophie dadurch zusammengefaßt zu haben, indem ich sagte: Philosophie 
dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten. Daraus muß sich, scheint mir, ergeben, wie weit mein Denken der Gegenwart, 
Zukunft, oder der Vergangenheit angehört. Denn ich habe mich damit auch als einen bekannt, der nicht ganz kann, 
was er zu können wünscht. (Wittgenstein 1979: 483). The English translations in this section stem from the 
electronic edition of the Collected Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, published by Intelex Corp. and were accessed 
through the Leiden University Library. 
 19 
 
Being Wittgenstein’s most explicit statement on philosophy and poetry, this passage merits 
close scrutiny. It is important to note Wittgenstein is talking about his attitude towards 
philosophy (Stellung zur Philosophie), not about philosophy itself. This is followed by the 
assertion that philosophy ought to be written as one writes a poem. While Wittgenstein is being 
prescriptive here about the way philosophy should be done, he immediately acknowledges that 
he does not wholly succeed by his own standards. He believes that the extent to which he has 
succeeded in writing philosophy as poetry though, will ultimately determine its legacy. The 
question mark hovering over this entry is what Wittgenstein considers writing philosophy “as 
one writes a poem” to be, which is a question of translation too. While in the original text the 
verb dichten aligns itself well with Wittgenstein’s assertion that he is talking about his attitude 
towards philosophy, the intimate connection between stance and verb is lost in the English 
translation. In English, the weight lies on the technicalities of writing philosophy as poetry, 
whereas the German original is more in sync with his assertion that he is describing an attitude.
 In addition to this key remark on the relation between Wittgenstein’s views on the way 
of doing philosophy and poetry, there are two other entries in Culture and Value that deal 
(in)directly with this subject. The first of these, an entry dated 1939-1940, addresses the way 
people conceive of the difference between scientists and artists: “People nowadays think, 
scientists are there to instruct them, poets, musicians etc. to entertain them. That the latter have 
something to teach them; that never occurs to them”.23 Against the idea that only science yields 
knowledge, Wittgenstein thus defends the view that poets and musicians also have things to 
teach us. Accordingly, the philosopher and the poet are not far removed from one another. If 
philosophy ought to be written as a form of poetry and poets are teachers, it seems that those 
who are teaching philosophy the right way can be deemed to be poets too. This does not mean 
that these philosophers necessarily write good poetry Another remark, dated 1947, elaborates a 
little bit more on this point:  
Just as I cannot write verse, so too I can write prose only up to a certain point, & no further. 
There is a quite definite limit to my prose, & I can no more overstep it, than I would be able to 
write a poem. This is how my equipment is constituted; it is the only equipment available to 
me. It is like someone’s saying: In this game I can attain only this level of perfection, & not 
that.24 
                                                          
23 Die Menschen heute glauben, die Wissenschaftler seien da, sie zu belehren, die Dichter und Musiker etc. sie zu 
erfreuen. Daß diese sie etwas zu lehren haben; kommt ihnen nicht in den Sinn (501). 
24 So wie ich keine Verse schreiben kann, so kann ich auch Prosa nur soweit, und nicht weiter, schreiben. Meiner 
Prosa ist eine Ganz bestimmte Grenze gesetzt, und ich kann ebenso wenig über sie hinaus, als ich es vermöchte, 
ein Gedicht zu schreiben. Mein Apparat ist so beschaffen; nur dieser Apparat steht mir zur Verfügung. Es ist, wenn 
wie Einer sagte: Ich kann in diesem Spiel nur diesen Grad der Vollkommenheit erreichen, und nicht jenen (533). 
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The fact that philosophy should be done like dichten does not imply that one should be good at 
writing verse, prose or poetry, as Wittgenstein readily acknowledges. This remark hints again 
at the difficulty of translating dichten as ‘writing [philosophy] as one writes a poem’, as 
observed before. Writing philosophy like dichten does not amount to writing poems.25 Rather, 
while bound by the ‘shackles’ of his philosophical prose, the philosopher should aspire to be a 
poet.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have argued what it means to understand Wittgenstein as a poetic philosopher. 
While there remains a lot more to be said on the relation between content and style, I have 
shown that an enumeration of all the places where Wittgenstein uses poetic imagery already 
firmly establishes him as a poet. We further noted that a lot of Wittgenstein’s poetic imagery 
has to do with seeing. I have argued that the main reason why he employs all these analogies, 
metaphors and similes, is that they make us see the relation between language and the world 
differently. From the Tractatus to Culture and Value, Wittgenstein tries to show how language, 
understanding and seeing are intertwined. The fly in the bottle is the philosopher who, by using 
the wrong language, cannot properly see and hence does not understand. In the next chapter, I 
will turn my attention to Fernando Pessoa, and to his heteronym Alberto Caeiro in particular. 
While this chapter revolved around the poetic dimension of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, I will 
discuss the philosophical side to Pessoa’s poetry in the next. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
one gained fame as a philosopher and the other as a poet, we will see that they express similar 
views on the relation between language, understanding and seeing.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Wittgenstein’s distinction between dichten as a stance and the act of writing poems finds an interesting parallel 
in Augustine’s discussion of ‘reading’.  For Augustine, “reading it constitutes on the one hand an imperfect way 
of acquiring knowledge (as it is inseparable from our flawed sense perceptions), but on the other it enables the 
reader to “approach a higher understanding” if the text is only “sufficiently authorative” (Stock 1996: 1).   
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CHAPTER 2 
A PHILOSOPHICAL POET: FERNANDO PESSOA 
It is both easy and difficult to write about philosophy within the Pessoan corpus. The fact that 
Pessoa wrote comparatively little under his own name and even left us the manuscript of an 
unpublished philosophical work makes it relatively easy to gain an understanding of the way 
he himself envisaged the relation between poetry and philosophy. What makes it at the same 
time very hard, however, is that his name is forever bound up with the names of Alvaro de 
Campos, Bernardo Soares and Alberto Caeiro, to name only a few. It is estimated that more 
than seventy heteronyms sprang from Pessoa’s pen, of which about four figure prominently 
within ‘his’ bibliography (Gibbs 1999: 226). As has been argued by various critics, it would be 
a mistake to attribute the writings of these authors to Pessoa himself.26 Throughout his life, 
Pessoa treated them as proper heteronyms, including their dates of birth and death. My 
discussion of the ‘philosophical’ Pessoa will hence consist of two parts.27 In the first part of this 
chapter, I will discuss those writings within the Pessoan corpus that are explicitly philosophical, 
and that have been collected within the Philosophical Essays. While by no means constituting 
a full-fledged philosophical system, they do give an interesting insight in what is considered to 
be ‘philosophy’ within Pessoa’s universe. Moreover, they are indicative of the difficulty of 
attributing philosophical positions to Pessoa, as many of them were ‘written’ by one of his 
heteronyms. In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss the works of the philosophical anti-
philosopher within the Pessoan corpus: Alberto Caeiro, Pessoa’s ‘master’. While explicitly anti-
philosophical, his The Keeper of Sheep (O Guardador de Rebanhos) ironically constitutes the 
clearest espousal of philosophical thought within the Pessoan corpus.    
                                                          
26 The relation between Pessoa and his heteronyms is a thorny issue. The view that we have to accept the likes of 
Caeiro and Reis (among many others) as heteronyms as opposed to pseudonyms is mainly based on a letter Pessoa 
wrote in 1935, in which he addresses the “génese” (birth) of his heteronyms. One has to conduct only a brief search 
in a university library, however, to find that there are many books and articles making claims about Pessoa’s 
metaphysics, romanticism, or philosophy. In this thesis, I want to fully respect Pessoa’s heteronomity, by not 
extrapolating philosophical points of view from one his heteronyms to Pessoa himself. As Simon Critchley writes 
in “Surfaciality: Some Poems by Fernando Pessoa, one by Wallace Stevens, and the brief Sketch of a Poetic 
Ontology”: “what is important to grasp with the idea of heteronymic authorship is that this galaxy does not orbit 
around one creative God-like authorial sun, but is a vast, shifting and interconnected energy field with numerous 
and conflicting centres that form into distinct personages” (Critchley 2015: 278). Or, as Pessoa put it clearly 
himself: “não penso nada do Caeiro, do Ricardo Reis ou do Álvaro de Campos” (I don’t think anything about 
Caeiro, Ricardo Reis or Alvaro de Campos) (http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/3007. Accessed 29 Jun. 2018). 
27 The Pessoan corpus lends itself to many different kinds of philosophical analysis. For reasons of conciseness 
and clarity, I will stick to those aspects that fall within the scope of this thesis, i.e. that touch upon the relation 
between seeing, language and understanding. For a thorough exploration of the affinities between Pessoa’s 
heteronomy with Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatics, see Morris (2014). For discussions of Pessoa and Heidegger, 
see my footnote 29. 
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 As neither Pessoa nor his heteronyms ever produced a fully worked out philosophical 
system, it is by no means my intention to uncover something like Pessoa’s philosophy. Instead, 
my investigation is meant to lay bare philosophical threads within Pessoa’s corpus that are 
strikingly similar to the ones we encountered within Wittgenstein’s. When the Pessoan corpus 
gets associated with that of a philosopher, it is usually compared to Heidegger’s philosophy of 
being.29 In this chapter, I will argue that a comparison between Pessoa’s writings and the works 
of Wittgenstein is just as fruitful. More specifically, I will try to show that Alberto Caeiro and 
Wittgenstein expound similar views on the relation between language, seeing and 
understanding. Lost in their dreams and concepts, Caeiro insists, the poets and philosophers 
either do not know how to see the world, or else they have learned to look at it in a distorted 
manner. Caeiro aspires to show them in their own language that they are mistaken, just as 
Wittgenstein does. However, the poet and the philosopher do differ in their analysis of the 
reason why, as I will discuss at the end of this chapter.     
 To argue that Caeiro’s work shows striking affinities with that of Wittgenstein does not 
imply that this is the case for the Pessoan corpus as a whole. The view that we should take 
Pessoa’s claims of the heteronymous character of his corpus seriously is confirmed by the  
existence of a vast gap between the philosophical preoccupations of Charles Robert Anon and 
Alexander Search (Philosophical Essays) and Alberto Caeiro, for example. While Caeiro’s 
poetry expresses a disdain for philosophical system building, this is exactly what Anon and 
Search do. The fragments that make up the Philosophical Essays are in their heavy-handedness 
and rigour more reminiscent of Kant than Wittgenstein. By juxtaposing the works of Anon and 
                                                          
29 See Jan Slaby’s “Living in the Moment: Boredom and the Meaning of Existence in Heidegger and Pessoa” 
(2017) or Michael Marder’s “Phenomenology of Distraction, or Attention in the Fissuring of Time and Space” 
(2011) for example. One of the very few authors that have explored philosophical affinities between the Pessoan 
corpus and Wittgenstein’s philosophy is Nuno Ribeiro. His A Filosofia Como Poetar: Escritos sobre Wittgenstein 
e Fernando Pessoa is the most sustained analysis of these two thinkers that I have come across. Ribeiro maintains 
that Wittgenstein’s notion of language games can help us understand Pessoa’s heteronymic literary procedures and 
that, vice versa, studying these literary procedures enables us to better comprehend the way in which 
Wittgenstein’s language games come about (Ribeiro 2016: 26/27). In doing so, Ribeiro however misinterprets 
Wittgenstein’s concept of language games. He writes that “A criação do pequeno drama que constitui cada 
personalidade literária corresponde ao establicemento de um determinado jogo de linguagem. O “drama em gente” 
que todós os heterónimos formam corresponde a um outro jogo de linguagem. Criar uma determinada 
personalidade heteronímica significa servir-nos da linguagem e fazer da gramática e das regras que a compõem 
um instrumento” (The creation of the little play that constitutes each literary character corresponds to the 
establishment of a certain language game. The “drama em gente” that the heteronyms constitute corresponds to a 
different language game. Creating a heteronymic character means using language to invent a grammar and rules 
to render it an instrument) (37). Ribeiro’s suggestion that we would be able to create our own language games 
through the creation of heteronymic characters sits uneasy with Wittgenstein’s assertion that language games are 
always part of a social practice. For Wittgenstein, language games do not get invented, but are firmly rooted in our 
form of life. Although my lecture of Ribeiro helped me in establishing Wittgenstein as a poetic philosopher, I 
hence will not take up his argument in this thesis. Instead, I argue that Caeiro, Pessoa’s master heteronym, practices 
philosophy in a way similar to Wittgenstein. 
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Search with that of Caeiro, I hope to convey an understanding of the enormous width of themes 
and styles within the Pessoan corpus and the unicity of Caeiro’s voice within it. The central 
question of this chapter is: How does Pessoa’s ‘philosophy’ relate to that of Wittgenstein? 
 
2.1  THE PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 
In his introduction to the Philosophical Essays, Nuno Ribeiro cites the following assertion by 
Pessoa about himself: “I was a poet animated by philosophy, not a philosopher with poetic 
faculties. I loved to admire the beauty of things, to trace in the imperceptible through the minute 
the poetic soul of the universe” (Ribeiro 2012: XII).30 Given that the Pessoan corpus consists 
of a whole series of heteronyms and considering the sheer amount of autobiographical 
statements Pessoa made, it is not easy to interpret this claim. Does it only hold for the works 
published under his own name, for example, or for his heteronyms as well? Moreover, as 
Ribeiro notes, “it was not only through poetic, literary, and fictional creations – that is to say, 
as “a poet” – that Pessoa expressed his interest in philosophy” (Ribeiro 2012: XIII). Edited by 
Ribeiro himself, the Philosophical Essays publication was intended to collect those fragments 
within the Pessoa archive that could be said to be “straightforwardly philosophical prose” 
(XIII). Things are, however, rarely straightforward within Pessoa’s universe. Instead of signing 
these fragments with his own name, most of them are either unsigned or attributed to Charles 
Robert Anon and Alexander Search, “two English literary personalities that Pessoa had 
invented in South Africa” (XVI). In order to shed some light on how we should understand the 
relation between Pessoa and his heteronyms in general, Ribeiro cites Pessoa extensively when 
the latter claims that 
 
You should approach these books as if you hadn’t read this explanation but had 
simply read the books, buying them one by one at a bookstore, where you saw 
them on display. You shouldn’t read them in any other spirit. […] That doesn’t 
mean you have the right to believe in my explanation. As soon as you read it, 
you should suppose that I’ve lied – that you’re going to read books by different 
poets, or different writers, and that through those books you’ll receive emotions 
and learn lessons from those writers, with whom I have nothing to do except as 
their publisher (XVII). 
 
 
                                                          
30 For the letter, see http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/2207 (Accessed 29 Jun. 2018). 
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Following other indications by Pessoa, we should moreover distinguish between different kinds 
of heteronyms within the Pessoan corpus. Alberto Caeiro and Ricardo Reis are to be considered 
full heteronyms for example, while Bernardo Soares has to be regarded as a semi-heteronym.31 
Based on statements by Pessoa on the matter, Ribeiro explains the difference between the two 
as follows: “a heteronym differs from its author, not only in its way of thinking and feeling, but 
also in its style of writing; a semi-heteronym only differs from its author in its way of thinking 
and feeling, not in its style” (XIX). Again, we have to be careful not to take Pessoa at face 
value. Is it for example possible to completely separate feeling and understanding on the one 
hand, and style on the other, as Pessoa is suggesting?      
 Given that substantial parts of the Philosophical Essays are attributed to Anon and 
Search, there is no way in which we can distil something like Pessoa’s philosophy from these 
fragments. However, both the “pre-heteronyms” of Anon and Search and the themes elaborated 
within these fragments are indicative of the heteronyms and themes Pessoa will later develop 
in his career, as Ribeiro argues. He writes that  
 
In the fabrication of these two pre-heteronyms and the texts written in their names, 
Pessoa begins to develop subjects that clearly influence his later heteronyms and 
heteronymic works. At the same time, a poetry “animated by philosophy” will be 
a poetry alive with the highly varied impulse of Pessoa’s early philosophical texts 
(XXI). 
 
In order to grasp the extent to which these heteronyms can truly be said to be heteronymous to 
Pessoa, we just have to take a look at the biographical backgrounds he provides for these 
heteronyms. Of Charles Robert Anon, for example, Pessoa gives us the following ‘auto-
biography’: 
 
I. Charles Robert Anon, 
Being, animal, mammal, tetrapod, 
primate, placental, ape, catar- 
rhyna,                        man; 
eighteen years of age, not 
married (except at odd 
moments) megalomaniac, 
                                                          
31 In the aforementioned 1935 letter to Adolfo Casais Monteiro, Pessoa writes about Soares that he is “um semi-
heterónimo porque, não sendo a personalidade a minha, é, não diferente da minha, mas uma simples mutilação 
dela. Sou eu menos o raciocínio e a afetividade. A prosa, salvo o que o raciocínio dá de tenue à minha, é igual a 
esta, e o português perfeitamente igual (a semi-heteronym because, although not being me, his character does not 
differ from mine, but is a simple mutation. It is me without reasoning and affection. The prose, except for the 
reasoning, is equal to mine, and his Portuguese perfectly the same) […]” (See 
http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/3007. Accessed 30 Jun. 2018). 
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with touches of dipsomania, 
dégénéré superior, poet, with 
pretensions to written humour, citizen 
of the world, idealistic philo- 
sopher, etc. etc. (to spare 
the reader further pains). 
[…] (XXII) 
 
Notwithstanding the non-conventional nature of Anon’s autobiography, the fact that there is 
such an autobiography at all indicates that we should indeed think of him as a character truly 
distinct from Pessoa. Given that the Philosophical Essays are either unsigned or attributed to 
Anon or Search, this autobiography compounds the difficulty of establishing Pessoa’s 
philosophy, in addition to the fragmented character of these essays. Despite all of these 
complications, a simple look at the contents of the Philosophical Essays does give us an idea 
of what is considered to be ‘philosophy’ within the Pessoan corpus. While the second part of 
the Philosophical Essays consists of addenda, the first part is “reconstructed according to 
various indications left by Pessoa” (XXXII). Its table of contents reads as follows: 
 
PART I. PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 
 
I – Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism 
(Unsigned) 
 
II – Essay on Free-Will (Charles Robert Anon) 
A) Projects 
B) Fragments 
 
III – On the Idea of Responsibility (Unsigned) 
 
IV – Essay on the Idea of Cause (Alexander Search) 
 
V – On Error (Unsigned) 
 
VI – On Sensation (Unsigned) 
 
VII – Essay on Heraclitus (Unsigned) 
 
VIII – On Thomas Aquinas (Unsigned) 
 
IX – Essay on Pascal (Unsigned) 
 
X – On the Limits of Science (Charles Robert Anon)  
 
 
 26 
 
As we may infer from the above, philosophy takes on a rather traditional guise within the 
Pessoan corpus. This can be perhaps best be explained by considering with which philosophers 
these different fragments try to establish a dialogue. Ribeiro notes that the ‘Essay on the Nature 
and Meaning of Rationalism’ was inspired by Kant, while Anon’s ‘Essay on Free-Will’ was 
informed by Schopenhauer’s Essay on Free-Will and Fouilée’s La Liberté et le déterminisme 
(XXXV). Considering that the Philosophical Essays date back to 1906-1907, it seems that 
neither Pessoa nor his heteronyms directly engaged with the philosophical ideas of their era, 
such as American Pragmatism, Fregean logic and Husserlian phenomenology. The writing style 
of these essays feels moreover rather pompous and forced, especially compared to the poems 
of Caeiro and Reis and the philosophical observations by Soares. The opening paragraph of the 
‘Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism’, for example, reads as follows: 
 
Rationalism holds that the only things that can be affirmed as facts are those which 
reduce experience by reason to the coordination called science. Rationalism holds 
that all things outside this are simply unknown, or as yet unknown; but it does not 
affirm either that they are unknowable or still less that they are false. For what 
cannot be proved cannot also be disproved. The affirmation that Christ is God, for 
example, cannot be rejected by a Rationalist because it cannot be affirmed by him. 
It may be an error; it may be the vision of a higher sight – the Rationalist cannot 
determine which it is, because he does not know a thing to be wrong unless he can 
subject it to reason, and he cannot affirm a sense to be non-existent simply because 
he himself has not got it (2). 
 
With its traditional tone and structure, the Philosophical Essays is far removed from 
Wittgenstein’s poetic philosophy in the Tractatus and the Investigations. Judging only from the 
writings of Anon and Search, relating Wittgenstein’s philosophy to that of Pessoa would be a 
futile undertaking. Much more striking, from a Wittgensteinian point of view, are the affinities 
with the work of Pessoa’s master, Alberto Caeiro, contained in The Keeper of Sheep. 
 
 
2.2  ALBERTO CAEIRO’S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTI-PHILOSOPHY 
 
According to Ricardo Reis (one of Pessoa’s other principle heteronyms), Alberto Caeiro was 
born in Lisbon in 1889, but lived almost his whole life with a great-aunt in the countryside.32  
Despite his lack of a formal education, he is the great thinker within the Pessoan corpus. 
                                                          
32 For the letter in which Reis gives a biography of Caeiro, see http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/3072 (Accessed 
29 Jun. 2018). 
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Caeiro’s ‘philosophy’ does not consist in building a philosophical system. Rather, he 
admonishes the philosophers and poets to stop thinking and start seeing, two injunctions which 
go hand in hand with one another for Caeiro.33 His most prominent collection of poetry is The 
Keeper of Sheep, written in 1911-1912. In the following, I will give a close-reading of some of 
the poems within this volume, in order to highlight the philosophical character of these works.  
I will argue that, like Wittgenstein, Caeiro continuously stresses the intimate relation between 
words, seeing and understanding.         
 The Keeper of Sheep is a collection of forty-nine poems allegedly all written on the same 
day (March 8th 1914), which Pessoa himself called “o dia triunfal da minha vida” (the triumphal 
day of my life).34 One of the most famous poems in this volume is called “There’s Metaphysics 
Enough in not Thinking about Anything” (Há Metafisica Bastante em Não Pensar em Nada).  I 
quote the poem, which I will put into dialogue with Wittgenstein, in full: 
 
V – There’s Metaphysics Enough in not Thinking about Anything 
There’s metaphysics enough in not thinking about anything 
What do I think about the world? 
I don’t know what I think about the world! 
If I became sick I would think about it. 
 
What do I make of things? 
What is my opinion of causes and effects? 
What have I meditated in regards to God and the soul 
And about the creation of the world? 
 
I don’t know. For me, thinking about it is closing my eyes 
And not think. Drawing the shades 
Of my window (that has no shades). 
 
The mystery of things? I don’t know what a mystery is! 
The only mystery is having people who think about it. 
Whoever is in the sun and closes his eyes, 
Begins ignoring what the sun is 
And thinking many things filled with heat. 
                                                          
33 In “O Guardador de Rebanhos e a Contradição de Alberto Caeiro em Relaçao ao Conhecimento”, Sandra Regina 
Tornquist argues that Caeiro’s poetry is characterized by a tension between his pagan worldview (which 
relinquishes reflection for harmony) and the act of writing poetry itself, which is necessarily abstract (Tornquist 
2009: 282). She describes Caeiro as someone “que busca não refletir sobre o que sente, no desejo de ser o mais 
naturel possível, mas que não consegue se desfazer do pensamento em seu dia a dia e na produção da poesia” (who 
tries not to reflect on what he feels, desiring to be as natural as possible, but does not succeed in relinquishing 
thought in his daily life and poetry) (282). Another philosophical contextualization of Caeiro’s poetry is offered 
by James Corby in “Fernando Pessoa’s Post-Romantic Sense of the World”, in which he retraces the pedigree of 
Caeiro’s belief that thinking obscures seeing to early German Romanticism (Corby 2011: 166).  
34 For the letter, see http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/3007 (Accessed 30 Jun. 2018). 
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But opens his eyes and sees the sun, 
And cannot think about anything, 
Because the sunlight is worth more than the thoughts 
Of all philosophers and poets. 
The sunlight doesn’t know what it does 
And because of that it doesn’t make mistakes and is common and good. 
 
Metaphysics? What metaphysics do those trees have? 
The one that makes them green and bodied with branches 
Giving fruit when it’s time, which doesn’t make us think, 
Us, that don’t know they’re there. 
But what better metaphysics than the one they have, 
Which is not knowing for what they live 
Nor knowing that they do not know it? 
 
“Intimate constitution of things”… 
“Intimate meaning of the Universe”… 
All this is false, all of this doesn’t mean anything. 
It’s incredible that we can think about these things. 
It’s like thinking about reasons and ends 
When the morning rises, and on the side of the trees 
A vague and lustrous gold loses itself to the darkness. 
 
Thinking about the intimate meaning of things 
Is added, like thinking about health 
Or taking a glass to the water of springs. 
 
The only intimate meaning of things 
Is that they don’t have any intimate meaning. 
I don’t believe in God because I never saw him. 
If he wanted me to believe in him, 
I have no doubt he would come talk to me 
And would walk through my door 
Telling me, Here I am! 
 
(This is maybe ridiculous to the ears 
Of someone, for not knowing what it is looking at things, 
Does not understand one who talks about them 
With the way of talking that noticing them teaches.) 
 
But if God is the flowers and the trees 
And the hills, and the sun and the moonlight, 
Then I believe in him, 
Then I believe in him all the time, 
And my life is all of it but a prayer and a mass, 
And a communion with the eyes and by the ears. 
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But if God is the trees and the flowers 
And the hills and the moonlight and the sun, 
Why do I call it God? 
I call it flowers and trees and hills and sun and moonlight; 
Because, if he made himself, for me to see him 
Sun and moonlight and flowers and hills, 
If he appears to me as being trees and hills 
And moonlight and sun and flowers, 
It’s because he wants me to know him 
As trees and hills and flowers and moonlight and sun. 
And for that I obey him, 
(What do I know more about God than God himself?), 
I obey him by living, spontaneously, 
Like someone who opens his eyes and sees, 
And I call it moonlight and sun and flowers and trees and hills, 
And I love him without thinking about him, 
And think about him by seeing him and hearing him, 
And I walk with him all the time.35 
 
Like so many of Caeiro’s poems, “There’s Metaphysics Enough in not Thinking about 
Anything” does not have a proper title. The opening verse of the poem simply doubles as such. 
In the first line, the poet asserts that there is enough metaphysics in thinking nothing, a statement 
that is immediately followed by a self-interrogation. The way Caeiro dismisses the question of 
                                                          
35 V – Há Metafisica Bastante em Não Pensar em Nada/ Há metafisica bastante em não pensar em nada./O que 
penso eu do mundo? /Sei lá o que penso do mundo!/Se eu adoecesse pensaria nisso. Que idéia tenho eu das cousas?/ 
Que opinião tenho sobre as causas e os efeitos?/ Que tenho eu meditado sobre Deus e a alma/ E sobre a criação do 
Mundo?  Não sei. Para mim pensar nisso é fechar os olhos/ E não pensar. É correr as cortinas/ Da minha janela 
(mas ela não tem cortinas).  O mistério das cousas? Sei lá o que é mistério!/ O único mistério é haver quem pense 
no mistério./ Quem está ao sol e fecha os olhos,/ Começa a não saber o que é o sol/ E a pensar muitas cousas cheias 
de calor.  Mas abre os olhos e vê o sol,/ E já não pode pensar em nada,/ Porque a luz do sol vale mais que os 
pensamentos/ De todos os filósofos e de todos os poetas./ A luz do sol não sabe o que faz/ E por isso não erra e é 
comum e boa.  Metafisica? Que metafísica têm aquelas árvores?/ A de serem verdes e copadas e de terem ramos/ 
E a de dar fruta na sua hora, o que não nos faz pensar,/ A nós, que não sabemos dar por elas.  Mas que melhor 
metafísica que a delas,/ Que é de não saber para que vivem/ Nem saber que o não sabem?  “Constituição íntima 
das cousas“…/“Sentido íntimo do Universo”…/ Tudo isto é falso, tudo isto não quer dizer nada./ É incrível que se 
possa pensar em cousas dessas./ É como pensar em razões e fins/ Quando o começo da manhã está raiando, e pelos 
lados das árvores/ Um vago ouro lustroso vai perdendo a escuridão.  Pensar no sentido íntimo das cousas/ É 
acrescentado, como pensar na saúde/ Ou levar um copo à água das fonts.  O único sentido íntimo das cousas/ É 
elas não terem sentido íntimo nenhum./ Não acredito em Deus porque nunca o vi./ Se ele quisesse que eu 
acreditasse nele,/ Sem dúvida que viria falar comigo/ E entraria pela minha porta dentro/ Dizendo-me, Aqui estou!  
(Isto é talvez ridículo aos ouvidos/ De quem, por não saber o que é olhar para as cousas,/ Não compreende quem 
fala delas/ Com o modo de falar que reparar para elas ensina.)  Mas se Deus é as flores e as árvores/ E os montes 
e sol e o luar,/ Então acredito nele,/ Então acredito nele a toda a hora,/ E a minha vida é toda uma oraçao e uma 
missa,/ E uma comunhão com os olhos e pelos ouvidos.  Mas se Deus é as árvores e as flores/ E as montes e o luar 
e o sol,/ Para que lhe chamo eu Deus?/ Chamo-lhe flores e árvores e montes e sol e luar;/ Porque, se ele se fez, 
para eu o ver,/ Sol e luar e flores e árvores e montes,/ Se ele me aparece como sendo árvores e montes/ E luar e sol 
e flores,/ É que ele quer que eu o conheça/ Como árvores e montes e flores e luar e sol.  E por isso eu obedeço-
lhe,/ (Que mais sei eu de Deus que Deus de si próprio?)/ Obedeço-lhe a viver, espontaneamente,/ Como quem abre 
os olhos e vê,/ E chamo-lhe luar e sol e flores e árvores e montes,/ E amo-o sem pensar nele,/ E penso-o vendo e 
ouvindo,/ E ando com ele a toda a hora. 
 30 
 
what he thinks of the world is reminiscent of Wittgenstein in both style and content. Caeiro 
immediately establishes a dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor, just as Wittgenstein does 
time and again in his notebooks and the Investigations. In addition, by dismissing the question 
as nonsensical and by affirming that only were he to fall ill would he think of his thoughts about 
the world, he shows himself to be in agreement with two leitmotifs within the Wittgensteinian 
corpus: the nonsensicality of metaphysical questions (Tractatus) and the comparison of 
mistaken ways of doing philosophy with sickness that needs therapy (Investigations).  
 Perhaps even more strikingly in line with Wittgenstein’s philosophy are the lines of the 
third verse, where Caeiro writes that having an opinion about things in general or cause and 
effects is equivalent to closing one’s eyes. He even claims that thinking these thoughts does not 
amount to thinking it all, comparing it to closing the curtains of a window that does not have 
any. These lines are reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s ambition to show the fly out of the fly bottle: 
the philosopher is so lost in his conceptual confusion that he does not see a way out, however 
plain to see it is for everyone else. A bit further down, Caeiro employs the platonic trope of 
closing one’s eyes while looking at the sun: with our eyes closed, we start to think many things 
that have to do with heat, but as soon as we open them, we are engulfed by the self-evidence of 
the sun’s light and our thoughts disperse.36 Compare these lines to the following by 
Wittgenstein in On Certainty: “I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and 
again ‘I know that that’s a tree’, pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and 
hears this, and I tell him: ‘This fellow isn’t insane. We are only doing philosophy’”.37 The 
philosopher is he who either forgets to open his eyes (Caeiro) or has learnt to look at things in 
an awkward way (Wittgenstein).38 Caeiro’s criticism of philosophers does not stop there. In 
verses 6-9 he rails against philosophical concepts that confuse instead of enlighten. According 
to Caeiro, contemplating the inner constitution of things or the inner meaning of the universe is 
only done by those who have not learnt what it means to see. The last verses of the poem centre 
                                                          
36 Ironically, though, it is impossible to look directly at the sun, as Derrida observes in “White Mythology”. While 
discussing Plato’s The Republic, one of the cornerstones of Western philosophy, he writes that “([...] the sun is 
there, but as the invisible source of light, in a kind of insistent eclipse. It is more than essential: it produces essence, 
being and appearing: the essence of that which is. One may not look upon it, on pain of blindness and death. 
Beyond that which is, it portends the Good, of which the sensible sun is the offspring: source of life and visibility, 
seed and light.)” (Derrida 1974: 43). 
37 “Ich sitze mit einem Philosophen im Garten; er sagt zu wiederholten Malen “Ich weiß, daß das ein Baum ist“, 
wobei er auf einen Baum in unsrer Nähe zeigt. Ein Dritter kommt daher und hört das, und ich sage ihm: “Dieser 
Mensch ist nicht verrückt: Wir philosophieren nur“ (Wittgenstein 1984: 213). 
38 In his aforementioned “Art as Technique”, Skhlovsky states that “[…] art exists that one may recover the 
sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things to make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the 
sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known” (Skhlovsky 1917: 2). Likewise, Caeiro and 
Wittgenstein try dispel our mistaken conceptualizations and lead us back to our ‘senses’.  
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on language and belief, in a manner reminiscent of Spinoza. If God wants to be known as the 
flowers and the trees, Caeiro asks himself, why would one call them anything other than flowers 
and trees?39 The reason why philosophers get carried away by constructing metaphysical 
systems is that they do not see; they simply have to open their eyes and look to know that trees 
are trees and flowers are flowers. Caeiro’s poetry is presented as a remedy for the poet’s and 
philosopher’s intellectual confusion, just as Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a therapy. 
 “There’s Metaphysics Enough in not Thinking about  Anything” is by no means the only 
poem in which Caeiro emphasizes the intimate relation between language, seeing and 
understanding. His affinity with Wittgenstein’s thought is also apparent in the poem “What We 
See of Things” (“O que Nós Vemos”), which reads as follows: 
 
XXIV – What We See of Things 
 
What we see of things are things themselves. 
Why should we see one thing if another existed? 
Why would seeing and hearing be illusions 
If seeing and listening are seeing and listening? 
 
The essential thing is to be able to see, 
To know how to see without thought, 
To know how to see when we’re seeing, 
And not even think about it 
Nor see when we think. 
 
But that (poor us that display our clothed soul!), 
That demands profound learning, 
A learning to unlearn 
And a sequestering of freedom from that convent 
In which the poets say that the stars are eternal nuns 
And the flowers convicted one-day penitents, 
But where, in the end, the stars are nothing but stars 
And the flowers but flowers, 
Being that the reason we call them stars and flowers.40 
 
                                                          
39 In the preface of part IV of his Ethics, Spinoza writes “[…] that Nature does not work with an end in view. For 
the eternal and infinite Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists. 
For we have shown, that by the same necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works” (Spinoza 2009: 
Part IV, Preface) 
40 XXIV – O que Nós Vemos. O que nós vemos das cousas são as cousas./ Por que veríamos nós uma cousa se 
houvesse outra?/ Por que é que ver e ouvir seria iludirmo-nos/ Se ver e ouvir são ver e ouvir?  O essencial é saber 
ver,/ Saber ver sem estar a pensar,/ Saber ver quando se vê,/ E nem pensar quando se vê/ Nem ver quando se pensa.  
Mas isso (tristes de nós que trazemos a alma vestida!),/ Isso exige um estudo profundo,/ Uma aprendizagem de 
desaprender/ E uma seqüestração na liberdade daquele convento/ De que os poetas dizem que as estrelas são as 
freiras eternas/ E as flores as penitents convictas de um só dia,/ Mas onde afinal as estrelas não são senão estrelas/ 
Nem as flores senão flores./ Sendo por isso que lhes chamamos estrelas e flores. 
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In the opening line of this poem, Caeiro dryly asserts that what we see of things is things. This 
seemingly trivial assertion is followed by the question why we should see one thing as another. 
These two lines introduce Caeiro’s insistence on seeing the world aright again, as becomes clear 
in the second verse, in which he writes that the main thing is knowing how to see and not to see 
when one thinks, and vice versa. Obvious as this all seems, Caeiro claims in the third verse that 
this skill requires a ‘learning to unlearn’. In terms recalling Wittgenstein’s description of his 
philosophy as therapy, Caeiro believes that seeing the world aright requires us to see through 
flawed concepts. The reason we call stars ‘stars’ and flowers ‘flowers’ is simply that they are 
stars and flowers respectively, nothing else. Caeiro thus shares the early Wittgenstein’s disdain 
for conceptual sophistry and metaphysical speculation. While discussing this poem in his article 
“Surfaciality: Some Poems by Fernando Pessoa, one by Wallace Stevens, and the brief Sketch 
of a Poetic Ontology”, Simon Critchley, in words strikingly reminiscent of Wittgenstein, 
summarizes Caeiro’s reasoning as follows: 
 
The scandal of philosophy […] is that we bewitch ourselves with thinking rather 
than seeing and delude ourselves that such is both the properly philosophical 
attitude and the true comportment towards things. The scandal is philosophy itself, 
if by that word we denote the activity of thinking and the cultivation of the 
theoretical attitude towards things (Critchley 2015: 282. Emphasis added).  
 
Things do not become ‘deeper’ whatsoever by invoking abstract concepts when everything 
there is, is out there already, plain to see for all. Poets and philosophers, however, simply do 
not seem to understand this. “The Mystery of Things” (O Mistério das Cousas) contains 
Caeiro’s most straightforward criticism of their ‘dreams’ and ‘ideas’: 
 
XXXIX - The Mystery of Things 
The mystery of things, where is it? 
Where is it that it doesn’t show itself 
At least showing us that it is mystery? 
What does the river know of this and what does the tree? 
And I, who am nothing more than them, what do I know of this? 
Every time I look at things and think about what men think of them, 
I laugh as a stream that sounds fresh in a rock. 
 
Because the only hidden meaning of things 
Is that they don’t have any hidden meaning, 
It is stranger than all that is strange 
And all the dreams of all the poets 
And the thoughts of all the philosophers, 
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That things are really what they appear to be 
And that there is nothing to understand. 
 
Yes, this is what my senses learned by themselves: 
Things have no meaning: they exist. 
Things are the only hidden meaning of things.41 
 
In the context of this poem, I recall a remark made by Wittgenstein in §89 of the Investigations: 
“[…] the essence of our investigation [is] that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We 
want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some 
sense not to understand”.42 When Caeiro reminds us again and again of not falling into the habit 
of seeking hidden meaning in the outside world, he seems to have a similar idea in mind. 
Apparently we constantly need to be reminded that what we want to understand is already in 
plain view and that we are only deceiving ourselves by erecting philosophical frameworks that 
impede rather than enhance understanding. As in the other two poems thus far discussed, this 
poem starts with a question that is so general as to show the nonsensicality of it. This time 
Caeiro ostensibly wonders where we have to locate ‘the mystery of things’, but then 
immediately dismisses this question altogether. In the second verse, he explains that the only 
hidden meaning of things is that they do not have a hidden meaning at all, which is “stranger 
than all the poets’ dreams and the philosophers’ thoughts”. Like Wittgenstein, Caeiro, locates 
meaning in the ordinary, not in the elaborate schemes and deceiving images of poets and 
philosophers. Hence he can all but laugh when he thinks about the explanations people have 
come up with when contemplating the mystery of things or their hidden meaning. 
 In “If I Sometimes Say that Flowers Smile” (Se às Vezes Digo que as Flores sorriem), 
Caeiro elucidates why philosophers and poets commit metaphysical sins time and again: they 
perceive a language where there is none. 
 
XXXI – If I Sometimes Say that Flowers Smile 
If I sometimes say that flowers smile 
                                                          
41 XXXIX – O Mistério das Cousas  O mistério das cousas, onde está ele?/ Onde está ele que não aparace/ Pelo 
menos a mostrar-nos que é mistério?/ Que sabe o rio disso e que sabe a árvore?/ E eu, que não sou mais do que 
eles, que sei disso?/ Sempre que olho para as cousas e penso no que os homens pensam delas,/ Rio como um regato 
que soa fresco numa pedra.  Porque o único sentido oculto das cousas/ É elas não terem sentido oculto nenhum,/ 
É mais estranho do que todas as estranhezas/ E do que os sonhos de todos os poetas/ E os pensamentos de todos 
os filósofos,/ Que as cousas sejam realmente o que parecem ser/ E não haja nada que compreender.  Sim, eis o que 
os meus sentidos aprenderam sozinhos:/ As cousas não têm significação: têm existência./ As cousas são o único 
sentido oculto das cousas. 
42 […] Wir wollen etwas verstehen, was schon offen vor unsern Augen liegt. Denn das scheinen wir, in irgend 
einem Sinne, nicht zu verstehen (Wittgenstein 2009: 47). 
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And if I say that rivers sing, 
It’s not because I think there’s smiles in flowers 
Or singing in rivers running… 
It’s because this way I can better make men feel 
The truly real existence of flowers and rivers. 
 
Because I write in order for them to read me I sometimes sacrifice myself 
To their stupidity of senses… 
I don’t agree with myself but I absolve myself, 
Because I am only that serious thing, an interpreter of Nature, 
Because there are men that do not understand its language, 
For there is no language at all.43 
 
Caeiro believes poets and philosophers are led astray either because they are blind and using 
the wrong words or because they see things the wrong way as a result of their conceptual 
confusion. If he sometimes employs the same kind of vocabulary as  they do, it is only because 
he wants them to read him so as to help these people. Of Wittgenstein’s philosophy the same 
could be said: while the rigid and logical structure of both the Tractatus and the Investigations 
invite the logician and the philosopher to read these works as logic or philosophy respectively, 
they actually criticize those very fields. Caeiro and Wittgenstein employ the language of poetry 
and philosophy against poetry and philosophy itself. They adopt the language of their readers 
in order to help them see the world differently. The poet and the philosopher, lost in their own 
worlds of words, can only be led to seeing the world aright by showing them in their own words 
that the images they conjure up and the concepts they employ are mistaken. By using the wrong 
words and asking the wrong questions, that which was ‘in plain view’ has slipped out of it. If 
Caeiro and Wittgenstein time and again scrutinize the poet’s and philosopher’s use of language, 
it is to teach them to see the world in a different light. As to the nature of this light, however, a 
considerable difference between the two reveals itself.    
 Caeiro ultimately rejects thinking at all and claims (while writing these philosophical 
poems) that he does not have a philosophy, but only senses. In “My Gaze” (O Meu Olhar), we 
read that:  
 
[…] 
                                                          
43 XXXI – Se às Vezes Digo que as Flores Sorriem  Se às vezes digo que as flores sorriem/ E se eu disser que os 
rios cantam,/ Não é porque eu julgue que há sorrisos nas flores/ E cantos no correr dos rios…/ É porque assim faço 
mais sentir aos homens falso/ A existência verdadeiramente real das flores e dos rios. 
Porque escrevo para eles me lerem sacrifice-me às vezes/ À sua estupidez de sentidos…/ Não concordo comigo 
mas absolvo-me,/ Porque só sou essa cousa séria, um intérprete da Natureza,/ Porque há homens que não percebem 
a sua linguagem,/ Por ela não ser linguagem nenhuma. 
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I believe in the world as I do in a sunflower  
Because I see it. But I don’t think about it. 
Because thinking is not understanding… 
 
The World was not made for us to think about it  
(Thinking is being eye sick)  
But for us to look at it and agree  
I don’t have a philosophy: I have senses…44  
 
[…] 
 
According to Caeiro, ‘thinking’ implies that one has eye problems. He thus exhorts us to 
relinquish thought and see nature in all its glory. While I have tried to show that Caeiro’s anti-
philosophy is comparable to Wittgenstein’s in its insistence on seeing through wrong language 
use, their reasons for being so critical of language greatly differ. While Wittgenstein set out to 
expose the inner workings of language, Caeiro holds a realist worldview.45 If he criticizes poets 
and philosophers for their language use and conceptual confusion, it is because they are blind 
to the reality of ‘flowers’, ‘trees’ and ‘stars’. With a child-like innocence, he wants to do away 
with all ‘false’ signs, such as metaphors and speculative concepts. For Caeiro, the physical 
world truly consists of ‘flowers’, ‘trees’ etc., not just as concepts, but as the material truth. 
Philosopher and poets have however lost this all too apparent truth out of sight because of their 
speculative concepts and mistaken mysticism. For the later Wittgenstein, on the other hand, 
these words would simply be part of our language games and not refer to an objective reality. 
The fact that we distinguish between ‘trees’ and ‘flowers’ only tells us something about our 
form of life and the rules of the language game we play. In contrast to Caeiro, he does not view 
language as a conglomeration of signs and referents, but as an enormous variety of language 
games governed by porous, social rules. Wittgenstein hence does not take aim at metaphorical 
                                                          
44[…] Creio no mundo como num malmequer/ Porque o vejo. Mas não penso nele/ Porque pensar é não 
compreender…  O Mundo não se fez para pensarmos nele/ (Pensar é estar doente dos olhos)/ Mas para olharmos 
para ele e estarmos de acordo…/ Eu não tenho filosofia: tenho sentidos… […]. 
45 In his introduction to The Keeper of Sheep, Ricardo Reis (one of Pessoa’s other main heteronyms) maintains 
that Caeiro’s work “represents the absolute essence of paganism, fully reconstructed. […] Caeiro’s oeuvre and its 
paganism were never thought through, nor were they even felt. They came from something within us deeper than 
feeling or reason. To say any more would be to explain, which serves no end; to affirm any less would be to lie” 
(Daniels 2007: 7). In addition, Caeiro himself has vehemently refused any kind of philosophical definition of his 
work, just as he did not want people to consider his work to be ‘poetry’. When Álvaro de Campos (another Pessoan 
heteronym) questions him as to whether his doctrine is akin to materialism (except for his poetry), Caeiro responds 
by saying that “Mas isso a que V. chama poesia é que é tudo. Nem é poesia: é ver. Essa gente materialista é cega. 
V. diz que eles dizem que o espaço é infinito. Onde é que eles viram isso no espaço?” (But that what you call 
poetry is everything. It is not poetry: it is seeing. Those materialists are blind. You say that they maintain that 
space is infinite. Where do they see that in space?) (http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/683. Accessed 30 Jun. 2018). 
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language (he employs it himself all the time, as we have seen), but at philosophers creating 
conceptual confusion by mixing up different language games.    
 While both Caeiro and Wittgenstein thus underscore the precedence of the ordinary over 
the abstract, they hold strongly different views of what seeing the world correctly implies: for 
Wittgenstein this entails understanding our use of language, whereas for Caeiro this amounts to 
nothing less than obtaining objective truth.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have tried to shed light on the ‘philosophical’ Pessoa. In order to do so, I first 
had to deal with the question of ‘heteronomy’. I have argued that, given Pessoa’s insistence that 
he did not share a way of thinking with his principal heteronyms, we should be extremely 
careful  when attributing ideas expressed by these heteronyms to Pessoa himself. Having made 
this preliminary point, I looked at the most straightforward of the philosophical writings within 
the Pessoan corpus, the Philosophical Essays. While being of relatively minor interest to my 
discussion of the philosophical affinities between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the Pessoan 
corpus, they did provide an insight into the functioning of Fernando Pessoa’s “heteronymic 
machine”, as Adam Morris calls it.46 Moving on from these essays, I discussed Alberto Caeiro’s 
most important collection of poems, The Keeper of Sheep. By close-reading some of the poems 
within this collection, I have tried to demonstrate some striking affinities between Caeiro’s 
‘anti-philosophy’ and Wittgenstein’s philosophical method. Like Wittgenstein, Caeiro time and 
again stresses the connection between language and seeing. Poets and philosophers do not see 
the world correctly because they are blind to the materiality of things and lost in their conceptual 
jumble. Whereas Wittgenstein offers his philosophy as a kind of therapy, Caeiro presents his 
poetry as lessons in unlearning. Their remedies do not follow from the same diagnosis, 
however: whereas Wittgenstein aspires to make the inner workings of language transparent in 
order to battle our bewitchment, Caeiro tries to bring the philosophers and poets back from their 
confused concepts to a ‘self-evident’ sensuous reality.    
 While Wittgenstein and Caeiro may ultimately hold different motivations for their 
                                                          
46 In “Fernando Pessoa’s Heteronymic Machine” (2014), Morris posits Pessoa’s heteronymic universe next to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatics. Regarding Pessoa’s claim that he too was one of Caeiro’s disciples, Morris 
writes that “[t]he effect of this “effacement” is that the concept of authorship is uprooted by the heteronymic 
machine, deterritorialized from a creative “subject” or “author” and banished to the nebulous territory of 
heteronimity and its constantly re-individuating individuals” (Morris 2014: 135).  
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philosophical method, they do share a disdain for the philosophy of the kind practised by Anon 
and Search. Wittgenstein and Caeiro are, as it were, ‘anti-philosophers’47: if they are practising 
philosophy at all, it cannot have anything to do with erecting metaphysical structures and 
abstract speculation. In the next chapter, I will define Wittgenstein’s and Caeiro’s poetic ‘anti-
philosophy’ further by invoking Kierkegaard’s notion of the ‘subjective thinker’. Acclaimed by 
Wittgenstein as “the most profound thinker of the 19th century” and using similar literary 
procedures as Pessoa, Kierkegaard suggests that ‘truth’ is subjective and can only be 
communicated indirectly (Drury 1984: 87). What precisely this subjectivity entails I hope to 
make clear in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Term coined by Badiou. See his Wittgenstein’s antiphilosophy (2011). 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SUBJECTIVE THINKER: SØREN KIERKEGAARD 
While Wittgenstein maintained that philosophy should be written poetically and Pessoa 
confessed himself to be a poet animated by philosophy, within Kierkegaard’s works the line 
between philosophy and poetry itself becomes blurred. A poet, a philosopher as well as a 
theologian, Kierkegaard’s oeuvre defies description. What makes Kierkegaard relevant to my 
discussion of Wittgenstein and Pessoa is that he is one of the few thinkers who have been 
associated with both authors, and that he offers a conceptual framework to think through the 
kind of poetic philosophy shared by Wittgenstein and Caeiro.48 In this chapter, I will appropriate 
Kierkegaard’s concepts of ‘indirect communication’ and the ‘subjective thinker’ in order to 
characterize the (anti-)philosophy of Wittgenstein and Caeiro. In contrast to the Hegelian 
philosopher, the subjective thinker does not content himself with changing people’s ideas; 
instead, he tries to alter the way his audience experiences the world. He does not believe in 
constructing a systematic philosophy, but attempts to convey a different way of understanding. 
Instead of telling his audience what to do, the subjective thinker tries to show them how to look. 
 It is by no means my intention to argue that the philosophical activity of Wittgenstein 
and Caeiro can only be understood from the viewpoint of the subjective thinker. I do think, 
however, that Kierkegaard’s subjective thinker offers a conceptual framework to render the 
interplay between poetry and philosophy within Wittgenstein and Caeiro’s thinking more 
intelligible. In “Existentialism and Analytical Philosophy”, Stanley Cavell writes that “[b]oth 
Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard see their worlds as laboring under illusion. Both see their 
function as authors to be the uncovering or diagnosing of this illusion, and freeing us from it. 
In both, the cure requires that we be brought back to our ordinary human existence” (Cavell 
1964: 958). As I have argued in the last chapter, the same goes for Caeiro. Instead of erecting 
philosophical systems, the subjective thinker tries to dispel metaphysical nonsensicality and 
conceptual confusion by bringing us back to our ordinary human existence.49 My central 
                                                          
48 See Drury (1984) and Alain Bellache-Zacharie (2012).  
49 The philosophical project of the subject thinker shares some striking traits with Merleau-Ponty’s physically 
based phenomenology. In Phenomenology of Perception, he writes that “the fundamental philosophical act would 
[…] be to return to the lived world beneath the objective world (since in this lived world we will be able to 
understand the law as much as the limits of the objective world)” (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 57). Instead of wanting to 
understand ‘objectivity’ as objectivity, the focus of our research should be the way in which the world presents 
itself to the subject. Such an enterprise would not just be an intellectual affair, but strongly rooted within the 
‘senses’: “Sensing is this living communication with the world that makes it present to us as the familiar place of 
our life. The perceived object and the perceiving subject owe their thickness to sensing” (53).   
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question in this chapter is: In what sense do Wittgenstein and Caeiro qualify as ‘subjective 
thinkers’? 
 
3.1  CLIMACUS’S INDIRECT COMMUNICAITON 
Kierkegaard introduces the notion of the subjective thinker in Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, a work attributed to Johannes Climacus.50 In Part II, 
entitled “The subjective problem. The subject’s relation to the truth of Christianity, or what it 
is to become a Christian”, Climacus opposes objective truth to subjective truth. Contrary to 
most philosophers, he proclaims himself to be interested in the latter. Climacus describes the 
difference between the two kinds of truth as follows: “For objective reflection the truth becomes 
something objective, an object, and the thing is to disregard the subject. For subjective 
reflection the truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the thing is precisely, 
in existing, to deepen oneself in subjectivity” (Kierkegaard 2009: 161). While objective truth 
is detached, subjective truth revolves around existence. Given that we are always somewhere 
in space and time, Climacus maintains that the path of truth for a human being is necessarily 
that of subjective truth. Against the Hegelians, he argues that our thinking is ultimately always 
grounded in existence.51 It is thus not by vaingloriously trying to erase our subjectivity that we 
arrive at truth, but by tapping into that very subjectivity. This has important consequences for 
the way we try to communicate the ‘truth’: since we cannot communicate our subjectivity 
(inwardness) directly, we necessarily have to do it indirectly.52 Grasping what it is to exist and 
knowing what inwardness means imply for Kierkegaard that      
If I wanted to communicate anything on this point, the main thing was that my 
exposition be in the indirect form. For if inwardness is the truth, result is only junk 
that we should not trouble one another with, and wanting to impart the result an 
unnatural form of interpersonal association, in so far as every human being is spirit 
and truth is precisely the self-activity of appropriation, which a result hinders 
(Kierkegaard 2009: 203). 
 
                                                          
50 Kierkegaard, like Pessoa, employed a whole array of pseudonyms in his work. For a portrait of Johannes 
Climacus, see Kierkegaard’s ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript’: a Critical Guide (2010).  
51 The relation between Kierkegaard and Hegel is far too contentious and complex to describe in a few sentences. 
Regarding subjective truth, Kierkegaard reproaches Hegel among other things for the fact that his thinking is 
ungrounded in ‘existence’, which precisely complicates thinking so much: “[…] [T]he Hegelian philosophy puts 
existence into confusion through not defining its relation to someone existing, by ignoring the ethical” (259). 
52 On page 171, Climacus explains why subjectivity is truth. Given the religious grounding of his argument and 
the longevity of his exegesis, I have decided to leave it out here. It is not so much my intention here to show that 
subjectivity is indeed truth, as to discuss to what kind of communication subjective truth leads to.  
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Students do not learn by copying whatever the teacher throws at them, but by internalizing the 
teacher’s truth through “self-activity” (203). They have to see the truth of what they are taught 
for themselves. For Kierkegaard, any direct communication of inwardness as such is a 
misunderstanding, as inwardness can only be communicated indirectly, through experience.53 
 In Chapter 3 of Part II entitled ‘the subjective truth, inwardness; truth is subjectivity’, 
Climacus expands on his notion of subjective truth by introducing ‘the subjective thinker’. 
Here, he explains why abstract thought does not succeed in finding answers to the questions 
that are most important to us: 
The suspect nature of abstract thought becomes evident exactly in connection with 
all existence-questions, where the abstraction removes the difficulty by dropping it 
and then priding itself on having explained everything. It explains immortality in 
general and, what do you know?, everything goes excellently in as much as 
immortality becomes identical with eternity, the eternity that is essentially the 
medium of thought. But whether an existing individual human being is immortal, 
which is just the difficulty, this is something that abstract thought does not trouble 
itself with. It is disinterested. Yet the difficulty with existence is what interests one 
who exists […] (253).  
 
In other words, abstract thought leads to general explanations that do not have any bearing on 
individual existence. The answers we get through abstract thinking hence do not provide us 
with answers to the questions most fundamental to us, i.e. the ones related to our existence. 
Kierkegaard does not qualify objective knowledge as nonsensical or unimportant, but highlights 
that the truths most important to us are necessarily subjective in character. The subjective 
thinker moreover practises what he preaches. The objective thinker, on the other hand, is easily 
caught out for his ingenuity: “[T]hat the thinker’s own existence contradicts his thinking, shows 
that one is merely lecturing. That thinking is higher than feeling and imagination is taught by a 
thinker who has himself neither pathos nor passion” (254).     
 The subjective thinker does not put thinking on a pedestal, but equally acknowledges 
the importance of feeling and imagination. He cannot cut his thinking loose from existence, nor 
does he want to. He necessarily thinks from within existence, as he cannot do otherwise. 
Climacus even states that it is “the subjective thinker’s task to understand himself in existence. 
[…] [T]he subjective thinker is one who exists, and yet he is one who thinks. He does not 
                                                          
53 In ‘Kierkegaard’s case for the irrelevance of philosophy’, Aumann notes that Climacus faces the same problem 
as the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus: of having to make statements that are impermissible by the criteria of the 
work itself. Aumann writes that “Climacus discusses the person who wants to communicate the conviction that 
“truth is inwardness; objectively there is no truth, but the appropriation is the truth” (CUP, p. 77). The challenge 
facing this person is to communicate his conviction without turning it into something that is itself an objective 
truth” (Aumann 2009: 236).  
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abstract from existence […] but is in it, and yet he is to think. In all his thinking, then, he 
includes the thought that he is someone existing” (294). Without touching upon the intricacies 
of Kierkegaard’s discussion of existence as a dialectic between possibility and actuality54, we 
understand that for Kierkegaard (or better, Climacus) subjective thinking entails (at least) both 
indirect communication and a passionate engagement with a subjective truth. In the following, 
I will relate the concept of the subjective thinker to the teachings of Wittgenstein and Caeiro. 
 
3.2  WITTGENSTEIN AND CAEIRO 
In 6.52 of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein writes that “[W]e feel that even 
when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain 
completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer”.55 
These Wittgensteinian phrases chime with Climacus’s observation that objective, detached 
knowledge does not bear at all on our existence. Even if we were to solve all scientific riddles, 
questions surrounding the meaning of life would persist. Although (the later) Wittgenstein does 
not claim to solve these Lebensprobleme, his philosophy is an attempt to at least render them 
transparent, by showing that they often prove to be linguistic problems at close inspection. And 
so does Caeiro. Neither Wittgenstein nor Caeiro make philosophical arguments that want to be 
judged to be true or false; above all, they offer a view of the world. They suggest that if we learn 
to look at the world in the way they propose, we will see that many of our assumptions prove 
to be metaphysical falsities. Heeding their own subjectivity, Wittgenstein and Caeiro do not 
disdain the ordinary for the abstract. Quite the contrary. In The Keeper of Sheep, Caeiro 
repeatedly scorns vague, abstract questions, none the more so than in “There’s Metaphysics 
Enough in not Thinking about Anything”: 
 
[…] 
What do I think about the world? 
                                                          
54 Kierkegaard’s subjective thinker contains far more (dialectic) intricacies than I can possibly convey here. Within 
Kierkegaard’s argument, faith plays a fundamental role, upholding subjectivity’s truth. In this chapter, my focus 
lies more with the type of thinker the subjective thinker represents, than with Kierkegaard’s conceptual grounding 
for its veracity. For more detailed discussions of indirect communication and the subjective thinker, see for 
example Kellenberger (1984) or Turnbull (2009). 
55 Wir fühlen, dass, selbst wenn alle möglichen wissenschaftlichen Fragen beantwortet sind, unsere 
Lebensprobleme noch gar nicht berührt sind. Freilich bleibt dann eben keine Frage mehr; und eben dies ist die 
Antwort (Wittgenstein 2018). 
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I don’t know what I think about the world! 
 […] 
What do I make of things? 
What is my opinion of causes and effects? 
 […] 
The mystery of things? I don’t know what a mystery is! 
 
By asking the wrong questions, we end up with the wrong answers. It is for this reason that we 
read in the Tractatus that “most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical 
works are not false but nonsensical” (4.003). In order to counter these falsities, Wittgenstein 
and Caeiro do not resort to more metaphysics. Instead, they try to teach their audience to  
dismiss metaphysics entirely. Instead of making other metaphysical claims to critique 
metaphysics, they teach us to look at the world differently. Wittgenstein and Caeiro do not 
aspire to add to our knowledge, but to rearrange our perception. As good (Kierkegaardian) 
teachers, they realize that they have to communicate indirectly: they can only give us the tools 
so that we can learn to see for ourselves. If Wittgenstein asks us to think of language as a city 
with old and new neighbourhoods or when Caeiro encourages us to look at the trees and think 
about their ‘metaphysics’, we should not take these exhortations as mere embellishment of some 
‘deeper’ thought. In order for them to make us understand how they themselves see the world, 
poetic imagery is instrumental. There is no other way to convey these thoughts; the message is 
intrinsically poetic. Instead of proffering abstract thoughts that do not relate to existence 
whatsoever, their philosophy is thoroughly subjective: our correct or incorrect understanding 
of the world is determined by our perspective, which hinges on the language we use. Whether 
we agree with what we see ultimately depends on whether we find the ‘truth’ they want us to 
see convincing, not on a particular argument.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have attempted to characterize the kind of philosophical activity Wittgenstein 
and Pessoa are engaged in. Having established that they are not philosophers in the orthodox 
sense of the word, I have used Kierkegaard’s notion of the ‘subjective thinker’ as a conceptual 
framework to frame their way of philosophizing. Although Kierkegaard’s subjective thinker is 
a much more complex figure than I could possibly convey in these pages, he distinguishes 
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himself among other things by his use of indirect communication and his passionate 
engagement with his subjective truth. I have argued that the subjective thinker can serve as a 
conceptual framework for understanding how philosophy and poetry are one within 
Wittgenstein and Caeiro’s works. By foregrounding seemingly trivial observations over 
abstract ideas and by teaching a perspective instead of a system, Wittgenstein and Caeiro share 
some fundamental traits with him. The truth they teach is lived and can only be conveyed 
indirectly, i.e. existentially and poetically. Their philosophy is necessary poetic and vice versa. 
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CONCLUSION 
Which are the philosophical affinities between Wittgenstein’s poetic philosophy and Pessoa’s 
philosophical poetry? 
In this thesis, I have argued for the existence of some profound philosophical affinities between 
Wittgenstein’s poetic philosophy and Caeiro’s philosophical poetry. In the first chapter, I 
argued that poetic imagery is essential to Wittgenstein’s method of doing philosophy. Insisting 
on the intimate relationship between language and seeing (correctly), Wittgenstein employs 
many idiosyncratic images to make us see his perspective on the nature of language. His poetic 
imagery serves to enable us to see through conceptual confusion as well as to render his 
alternative view perceptible. In the second chapter, I discussed Pessoa’s ‘philosophy’. Starting 
from the most ‘purely’ philosophical of his works, the Philosophical Essays, I have argued for 
the importance of taking the heteronymous character of Pessoa’s work seriously, hence 
precluding the very possibility of establishing a Pessoan philosophy. While the Philosophical 
Essays were seen to differ substantially from Wittgenstein’s poetic philosophy, Alberto 
Caeiro’s The Keeper of Sheep proved to contain various philosophical thoughts akin to those of 
Wittgenstein. I noted Caeiro’s insistence that by learning to see the right way, we become able 
to see through abstract concepts that only confuse instead of enlighten. His poetry consists of 
lessons in unlearning, similar to the way in which Wittgenstein considered his (later) philosophy 
to be a remedy against language’s bewitchment. In order to frame this kind of philosophy, 
which is firmly rooted in existence and emphasizes the intimate relationship between using the 
right language and seeing aright over abstract system building, I introduced the Kierkegaardian 
notion of the subjective thinker. More specifically, in my third chapter I have argued that 
Kierkegaard’s ‘subjective thinker’ offers a conceptual framework for thinking through 
Wittgenstein’s and Caeiro’s methods of philosophizing that is deeply rooted in subjectivity and 
very critical of philosophy itself.        
 While I believe the philosophical affinities between Wittgenstein’s and Caeiro’s ‘anti-
philosophy’ to be apparent, this is much less clear for the Pessoan corpus as a whole. As 
heteronymity is such a fundamental trait of the Pessoan corpus, the central question of this 
thesis is perhaps unanswerable. Moreover, the corpus as a whole raises many philosophical 
questions that I have not been able to address within the confines of this thesis and of which I 
believe we still have only scratched the surface. Just as the poetic quality of Wittgenstein’s 
work has rarely been the focus of the philosopher’s attention, Pessoa’s ‘philosophy’ has been 
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overlooked by literary scholars.56 One of my reasons for wanting to write this thesis has been 
to bridge this gap. Having been trained in both philosophy and literary studies, I have been 
surprised by the lack of overlap between these two fields of study. The works of Wittgenstein 
and Caeiro, in any case, provoke us to rethink the boundaries between them. Is Caeiro for 
example less of philosophical interest because he writes poetry? Conversely, are not literary 
forms essential to Wittgenstein’s philosophy? From the perspective of the subjective thinker, it 
does not matter whether one writes philosophy or poetry: it is the subjective truth one tries to 
communicate. In this thesis, I have tried to show that approaching Wittgenstein from a literary 
point of view and reading Caeiro as a philosopher sheds new light on both. For future research, 
I recommend analysing Wittgenstein’s writing style in more detail, beyond his poetic imagery, 
with a special focus on his figures of speech. In addition, I propose studying the nature of his 
metaphors in much greater depth, by analysing them through the lens of Lakoff’s 
“contemporary theory of metaphor” for example. Regarding Pessoa, I suggest a juxtaposition 
of the philosophical strands corresponding to his various heteronyms. Such an overview would 
give us both a better understanding of the ‘philosophical’ Pessoa and would render the wealth 
of philosophical ideas present within the corpus more conspicuous. I think both these research 
project would prove highly rewarding.       
 By setting out to analyse the philosophical affinities between Wittgenstein and Pessoa, 
I may have fallen into the trap that Wittgenstein and Caeiro warn us against time and again: that 
the wrong conceptual distinctions lead us to asking the wrong questions. However, if I have 
succeeded in opening up a new perspective on the relationship between poetry and philosophy 
by pointing out some essential affinities between Wittgenstein and Caeiro, I consider my 
mission completed, if only from the point of view of our ‘subjective thinkers’.  
 
           
 
 
 
                                                          
56 The Universade Nova de Lisboa has recently set up a research group on ‘literature and philosophy’ to fill this 
lacuna. They maintain that “The relationship between philosophy and the poetic thinking of Pessoa is still a 
massively overlooked aspect in both philosophical research and Pessoan Studies” 
(http://www.aelab.ifilnova.pt/pages/research-group-on-pessoa-and-philosophy. Accessed 29 Jun. 2018). 
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